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I. INTRODUCTION 
Revolution is in the air.  The corridors of American law schools 
are teeming with talk of curricular reform as faculties and administra-
tors across the country contemplate the implications of the Carnegie 
Report’s recent assessment of the quality of legal education.1  Many of 
the criticisms are familiar: graduating law students lack practical ex-
perience and an appreciation for professional values.2  But unlike 
past indictments, the Carnegie Report stands poised to be the first to in-
spire concrete changes in curriculum and pedagogy.3  In the same 
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 1 WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF 
TEACHING, EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW (2007) [he-
reinafter THE CARNEGIE REPORT]. 
 2 Id. at 126–28.  The Carnegie Report’s most recent predecessor, the American Bar 
Association’s “MacCrate Report,” similarly concluded that students were wanting in 
these fundamental areas.  See LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT: AN 
EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, 1992 A.B.A. SEC. ON LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE 
BAR [hereinafter THE MACCRATE REPORT]. 
 3 While the MacCrate Report also generated significant discussion within the 
legal academy, it has resulted in only minimal change in legal teaching and curricu-
lum. See, e.g., Keith A. Findley, Rediscovering the Lawyer School: Curriculum Reform in Wis-
consin, 24 WIS. INT’L L.J. 295, 307–10 (2006) (discussing that while clinical programs 
have expanded as a part of law school curriculum, at most schools they can accom-
modate only a minority of students); Victor Fleischer, Deals: Bringing Corporate Trans-
actions into the Law School Classroom, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV 475, 478 (2002) (noting 
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year as its release, Harvard Law School, the pioneer of the predomi-
nant method of law school pedagogy, announced a major curricular 
overhaul,4 and to date, at least three national law schools have fol-
lowed suit.5 
Yet the legal academy has much to consider on the subject of 
professional training before picking up the Carnegie gauntlet.  Prep-
aration for practice is not a unitary issue.  For many of the same rea-
sons that law schools have marginalized skills instruction, they have 
also long sacrificed transactional training in favor of litigation prepa-
ration.6  This bias persists in the current “skills” curriculum, which 
mostly emphasizes brief writing, advocacy, and litigation-based clinic 
opportunities.7  This bias also goes wholly unmentioned in the Carne-
that most law students will graduate without ever being exposed to transactional 
skills); Alice M. Noble-Allgire, Desegregating the Law School Curriculum: How to Integrate 
More of the Skills and Values Identified by the MacCrate Report into a Doctrinal Course, 3 
NEV. L.J. 32, 32–33 (2003) (urging more professors to incorporate skills training into 
traditional legal courses).  See generally THE CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 190 
(“[E]fforts to improve legal education have been more piecemeal than comprehen-
sive.  Few schools have made the overall practices and effects of their educational ef-
fort a subject for serious study.  Too few have attempted to address [their] inadequa-
cies on a systematic basis.”). 
 4 The new curriculum features foundational courses in legislation and regula-
tion and international and comparative law, five delineated upper level “courses of 
study,” the adoption of a required complex-problem solving course designed to simu-
late a real life practice situation, and expanded clinical opportunities.  See Elaine 
McArdle, A Curriculum of New Realities, HARV. LAW BULL. (Harvard Law Sch., Cam-
bridge, Mass.), Winter 2008, at [PIN CITE], available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/bulletin/2008/winter/feature_1.php. 
 5 See Vesna Jaksic, For One Law School, the Third Year is Getting Real, NAT’L L.J., 
Mar. 21, 2008, at 1 (reporting that Washington and Lee University School of Law re-
quires all third year law students to participate in legal work with real clients as a re-
placement for traditional courses); Katherine Mangan, New Hampshire Allows Law 
Students to Demonstrate Court Skills in Lieu of Bar Exam, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., July 4, 
2008, at 1 (describing a program at Franklin Pierce Law Center in which selected 
students take specialized courses during the last two years of law school in which they 
take depositions, argue in front of judges, and participate in a mock trial); Lauren 
Robel, Letter, IND. L. UPDATE (Univ. of Ind. Sch. of Law, Bloomington, Ind.), Ju-
ly/Aug. 2007, at [PIN CITE], available at 
http://www.law.indiana.edu/publications/ilu/200708.html (discussing changes to 
the curriculum at the Indiana University School of Law requiring first year students 
to take a course regarding the “economics and values of the profession”). 
 6 See Fleischer, supra note 3, at 485; Larry T. Garvin, The Strange Death of Academic 
Commercial Law, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 403, 405, 421 (2007); Eleanor W. Myers, Teaching 
Good and Teaching Well: Integrating Values with Theory and Practice, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
401, 405 (1997); Louis N. Schulze, Jr., Transactional Law in the Required Legal Writing 
Curriculum: An Empirical Study of the Forgotten Future Business Lawyer, 55 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 59, 91–93 (2007). 
 7 See Edward A. Dauer, Reflections on Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Creative Problem Solv-
ing, and Clinical Education in the Transactional Curriculum, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 483, 
485 (2005) (“Rights-based and public-interest litigation is still the dominant flavor of 
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gie Report.  Adoption of the Carnegie Report prescription without care-
ful self-reflection thus risks replicating this long-standing error. 
This Article joins a growing body of literature that applies the 
traditions of the “Scholarship of Teaching and Learning” movement 
to the workings of the legal academy.8  This Article argues that, as 
part of the effort to implement the Carnegie Report, law schools must 
specifically address their primordial weakness in preparing students 
for transactional practice and posits the basic employment law course 
as an appropriate platform for such an initiative.  The state of trans-
actional law education has been much lamented by commercial law 
and business-oriented faculty,9 and efforts to enhance training in this 
area have generally focused on developing skills-focused “deals” 
courses or adding skills components to basic contracts and business 
law offerings.10  While such approaches create welcome opportunities 
for transactionally-minded students, they do not address the margin-
alization of transactional thinking within the larger curriculum.  Ul-
timately, transactional skills are not inherently connected to the busi-
ness and commercial law fields, but rather are one application of a 
clinical offerings.”); Schulze, supra note 6 (concluding, based on survey of law 
schools’ curricular offerings and course content, that only slightly over thirty percent 
of mandatory legal research and writing courses include transactional drafting).  A 
noteworthy exception to the predominance of litigation-based skills opportunities is 
the Integrated Transactional Practice course offered at Temple University.  See 
Myers, supra note 6, at 406–07. 
 8 See ERNEST L. BOYER, THE CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF 
TEACHING, SCHOLARSHIP RECONSIDERED: PRIORITIES OF THE PROFESSORIATE [PIN CITE] 
(1990).  The Scholarship of Teaching and Learning (SOTL) is described as an effort 
to apply the methods and rigor of scholarship to the workings of the classroom.  See 
MARY TAYLOR HUBER & PAT HUTCHINGS, THE CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING: BUILDING THE TEACHING 
COMMONS 18 (2005).  For some examples of law school-related work in this tradition, 
see Andrea A. Curcio et al., Does Practice Make Perfect? An Empirical Examination of the 
Impact of Practice Essays on Essay Exam Performance, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 271 (2008); 
Larry O. Natt Gantt, II, Deconstructing Thinking Like a Lawyer: Analyzing the Cognitive 
Components of the Analytical Mind, 29 CAMPBELL L. REV. 413 (2007); Alice M. Thomas, 
Laying the Foundation for Better Student Learning in the Twenty-First Century: Incorporating 
an Integrated Theory of Legal Education into Doctrinal Pedagogy, 6 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 49 
(2000). 
 9 See, e.g., Garvin, supra note 6, at 405, 421; Schulze, supra note 6, at 100; Debra 
Progrund Stark, See Jane Graduate: Why Can’t Jane Negotiate a Business Transaction? 73 
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 477, 487–88 (1999). 
 10 See, e.g., Fleischer, supra note 3, at 491–92 (describing Columbia University 
School of Law’s “deals program,” which includes courses based on simulated transac-
tions and actual deal papers presented by area lawyers); Seth Freeman, Bridging the 
Gaps: How Cross-Disciplinary Training with MBAs Can Improve Transactional Education, 
Prepare Students for Private Practice, and Enhance University Life, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & 
FIN. L. 89, 95 (2008) (urging programs in which law students work with business stu-
dents to enhance skills involving corporate negotiations). 
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broader theory of preventive law practice.11  In this respect, they re-
flect a type of service that any well-trained lawyer ought to be able to 
provide—the ability to structure a relationship consistent with client 
intent while minimizing future risk—regardless of the legal disci-
pline.  To train students to perform this type of service, law school 
faculty in all substantive law areas need to seek out the transactional 
aspects of their fields of expertise and leverage those teachable mo-
ments across the curriculum.  In a twist on the old adage, it is law 
professors who must be retrained to think like lawyers. 
Employment law is an area well suited to advancing this goal.  In 
recent decades, the employment law field has migrated away from its 
public law tradition toward a model in which private ordering holds 
significant sway.  State courts appear to be rolling back the progress 
employees made in asserting breach of contract claims in the early 
1980s by treating employer-drafted disclaimer language as dispositive 
of employees’ at-will status.12  Under employment discrimination laws, 
courts now examine employer efforts to prevent and respond to un-
lawful behavior in assessing vicarious liability13 and consistently route 
statutory claims to private arbitration based on ordinary contract 
 11 Preventive law practice aims to “help their clients achieve their personal or or-
ganizational or familial or corporate goals, by optimizing the arrangements that are 
relevant to those goals and by minimizing the chance that the purpose is con-
founded with unnecessary legal risks.” Edward A. Dauer, Preventive Law Before and Af-
ter Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 800, 801 (1999); see also Den-
nis P. Stolle et al., Integrating Preventive Law and Therapeutic Jurisprudence: A Law and 
Psychology Based Approach to Lawyering, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 15, 16 (1997); see infra Part 
II.C.  See generally Myers, supra note 6, at 406 (“‘[T]ransactional teaching’ is not a 
question of subject matter . . . . Rather we use the term to signal a perspective shift. . . 
.  We encourage students, first, to assume the viewpoint of the actors and their law-
yers rather than that of impartial decision-makers and, second, to look at the transac-
tion as it unfolds, not after it has become a problem.”). 
 12 See, e.g., Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, 139 P.3d 56, 59 (Cal. 2006) (affirming 
summary judgment for employer on plaintiff’s breach of implied job security con-
tract claim based on “terminable at-will” proviso in unilaterally drafted offer letter 
despite employer promises of long-term employment and practice of terminating 
workers only for cause); Levitan v. Apple Computer, Inc., No. CV795189, 2003 
LEXIS 3972, at *2 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct., April 18, 2003) (affirming summary 
judgment for employer based on terminable at-will language in unilaterally drafted 
offer letter despite express promise by human resources manager during hiring 
process that plaintiff could retain residence outside of state and commute to work); 
see also infra Part II.B.1. 
 13 See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (recognizing af-
firmative defense to liability where employer exercised reasonable care to prevent 
and correct harassing behavior and that unreasonably failed to take advantage of 
employer’s preventative or corrective procedures); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 
524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) (same); infra Part III.B.1. 
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principles.14  Along with these doctrinal developments, employers are 
becoming more aware of personnel matters as an area of legal expo-
sure that must be managed and controlled.  Companies routinely re-
quire starting employees to sign form documents, such as arbitration 
agreements and covenants not to compete,15 and it has become stan-
dard practice for companies to maintain formal policies on every-
thing from sexual harassment to dispute resolution.16  Employment 
law scholarship too has recognized the broadening trend, citing the 
internal compliance behavior of employers as an important site of 
scholarly inquiry.17  Thus, an emerging body of literature has begun 
to theorize the role of corporate actors and their agents, particularly 
their lawyers, in achieving the normative goals of workplace regula-
tion.18 
As of yet, however, there has been little to no assessment of how 
these interrelated developments in employment law scholarship, ju-
risprudence, and practice affect the domain of the classroom.  This 
 14 See Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001) (holding employment con-
tracts to be “transactions involving commerce” subject to the Federal Arbitration Act 
unenforceable only on grounds recognized under general state contract law); see in-
fra Part III.B. 
 15 I have described this trend in several prior articles.  See generally Rachel Arnow-
Richman, Cubewrap Contracts: The Rise of Delayed Term, Standard Form Employment 
Agreements, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 637 (2007) [hereinafter Arnow-Richman, Rise of Delayed 
Term]; Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts and Worker Mobility: The Dilution of 
Employee Bargaining Power Via Standard Form Noncompetes, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 963 
(2006) [hereinafter Arnow-Richman, Worker Mobility]. 
 16 See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, When the “Haves” Hold Court: 
Speculations on the Organizational Internalization of Law, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 941, 976 
(1999) (describing employers’ internal implementation of “private legal systems” to 
address workplace disputes); Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 
2122 (2003) (describing employers’ wide-spread and aggressive use of sexual harass-
ment policies). 
 17 See Mark C. Suchman & Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Rational Myths: The New Insti-
tutionalism and the Law and Society Tradition, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 903, 908 (1996) 
(describing emergence of new institutionalist perspective in organizational analysis 
and its relationship to law and society scholarship); Michelle Travis, Lashing Back at 
the ADA, 76 TENN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 48–50, on file with au-
thor) (describing the “new institutionalist” agenda in employment law scholarship); 
see infra Part III.B. 
 18 See, e.g., Rachel Arnow-Richman, Public Law and Private Process: Toward an Incen-
tivized Organizational Justice Model of Equal Employment Quality for Caregivers, 2007 UTAH 
L. REV. 25 (2007); Lauren B. Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Griev-
ance Procedures as Rational Myths, 105 AMER. J. SOC. 406 (1999); Cynthia Estlund, Re-
building the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319 
(2005); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise Of Governance in 
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004); Schultz, supra note 16; Susan 
Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. 
L. REV. 458 (2001); Travis, supra note 17. 
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Article fills that gap.  It calls for the redeployment of the basic em-
ployment law course as a skills-doctrine hybrid that integrates the 
analytical and applied aspects of transactional lawyering through 
practice-focused exercises and discussion.  In so doing, it offers a pe-
dagogical prescription that embraces the crisis in transactional train-
ing, the legacy of recent developments in employment law and prac-
tice, and at least a subset of the challenges identified in the Carnegie 
Report.19 
The Article proceeds as follows:  Part II sets out the key chal-
lenges facing legal education, intersecting the recommendations of 
the Carnegie Report with the long-standing curricular divide between 
advocacy work and transactional law practice in the legal academy.  
Part III examines the state of employment law in the curriculum and 
on the books, demonstrating that the field is ripe for creative reform 
showcasing the growing transactional dimensions of the practice.  
Part IV implements the Article’s theoretical contribution, offering a 
concrete illustration of the use of transactional law pedagogy in the 
employment law course.  Finally, Part V offers preliminary thoughts 
on the future of the law school curriculum and the “Scholarship of 
Teaching and Learning” with an eye toward encouraging and sup-
porting creative and integrative law school teaching. 
II. SKILLS VERSUS DOCTRINE, AND OTHER  
(TRUE AND FALSE) CURRICULAR DIVIDES 
The 2007 Carnegie Report offers a serious critique of what goes on 
in our law schools.20  Principal among the concerns raised by the Car-
negie Report is the lack of instruction in the important area of practical 
 19 This Article focuses specifically on the Carnegie Report’s recommendations on 
integrating practical training.  It does not directly address the Carnegie Report’s paral-
lel critique and recommendations concerning law schools’ treatment of professional 
values.  However, invoking realistic practice situations in the classroom inevitably 
leads to questions about professionalism and ethics.  See Myers, supra note 6, at 411–
19 (describing how simulated transactions create a rich context for raising and ex-
ploring questions of professional responsibility).  In that respect, such issues are ad-
dressed here as well, albeit less comprehensively. 
 20 THE CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1.  A similar and somewhat more proscriptive 
exploration of the subject can be found in the Clinical Legal Education Associations 
report published shortly after the release of the Carnegie Report.  See ROY STACKEY ET 
AL., CLINICAL LEGAL EDUC. ASS’N, BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION (2007) [here-
inafter CLEA].  Because the Carnegie Report was first in time and seems to have more 
thoroughly infiltrated the legal academy’s consciousness, I refer principally to its 
pronouncements while recognizing that others have identified and thoughtfully pre-
sented similar concerns about the state of legal education. 
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training.21  Schools do well preparing students to think like lawyers, 
but they do little to assist them in being lawyers. 
This assessment, while accurate and valuable, oversimplifies the 
challenges facing legal education in one significant respect.  The 
Carnegie Report’s characterization of the “apprenticeship of practice”22 
and its calls for reform within the legal academy accept the implicit 
but institutionally pervasive construct of the lawyer as a legal advocate 
principally concerned with the resolution of disputes.  The Carnegie 
Report does not consider the degree to which essential components of 
cognitive learning as well as practical skills—those necessary to a 
transactionally-focused practice—are not merely segregated from 
mainstream doctrinal instruction but largely unrepresented in any 
aspect in the current curriculum. 
This Part sets forth the principal findings of the Carnegie Report 
before turning to the special problem of transactional skills training.  
Transactional skills, and indeed transactional thinking, have been 
marginalized within the legal academy owing to the supremacy of the 
institution’s public law focus, a decline in business and commercial 
law teaching and scholarship, and, most fundamentally, a misunder-
standing of the nature of transactional practice.  Contrary to the pre-
vailing view of transactional planning as a distinctly private law com-
petency, transactional skills and thinking are inherent components of 
a general legal practice, broadly applicable to all substantive disci-
plines.  This Part concludes by drawing on the scholarship of preven-
tive law theory to build a foundation for a new “pedagogy of practice” 
that will further the Carnegie Report’s goal of enhancing practical 
training and will address the legal academy’s particular weaknesses in 
preparing students for transactional practice. 
A. An Intellectual Success, a Practical Failure 
In 2007, the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of 
Teaching issued its much awaited report on the state of American le-
gal education.  The Foundation’s conclusions are at best mixed and 
at worst an indictment of serious and long-neglected shortcomings in 
the current system. 
Law schools get high marks in the first of three identified “ap-
prentices” to professional competence—the transmission of cognitive 
knowledge.23  The Carnegie Report credits law schools’ signature peda-
 21 THE CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 77; CLEA, supra note 20, at 16–18. 
 22 THE CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 27. 
 23 Id. (using the concept of “apprenticeship” as a “metaphor [extending] to the 
whole range of imperatives confronting professional education . . . [which are to 
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gogy, the Socratic dialogue, with quickly inculcating students into the 
art of legal thinking.24  In short order, entering law students learn to 
parse and evaluate cases, articulate and apply legal rules, identify and 
categorize legal issues, and formulate and counter legal arguments.25  
In this respect, the Carnegie Report deems the structure of legal educa-
tion a relative success.26 
From there, things deteriorate quickly.  Law schools do not carry 
through on the two remaining apprenticeships; the pedagogies of 
practice and of professional identity.27  With respect to the former, 
the standard curriculum provides limited skills instruction in a few 
discrete (and often optional) courses typically taught by faculty of 
lower academic status than the so-called substantive faculty.28  Stu-
dents are not exposed to the “shadow pedagogy” of learning in con-
text; they are only infrequently taught through the perspective of cli-
ents in real or simulated cases.29  In this way, law school differs 
markedly from other institutions of advanced professional learning, 
such as medical school where patient contact and clinical experience 
is a principal site of learning early on and throughout students’ ma-
triculation.30  As a result, law students graduate ill-equipped to handle 
the complexity of client-centered situations and are unsure how to re-
spond to practical exigencies, as well as moral concerns, that do not 
prepare students] to think, to perform, and to conduct themselves like profession-
als”). 
 24 See id. at 185–86. 
 25 See id. at 186. 
 26 See id. (concluding that law schools’ ability to take students from “a wide variety 
of social backgrounds and undergraduate experiences” and teach them to “‘think 
like a lawyer . . . is an accomplishment of the first order that deserves serious consid-
eration from educators . . . [in] other professional fields”). 
 27 See id. at 28–29. 
 28 See THE CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 87–88. 
 29 See id. at 56–57. 
 30 See id. at 57 (likening the omission to training doctors by focusing instruction 
on disease process rather than patient care); Fleischer, supra note 3, at 483 (“New 
lawyers do not know how to swim on their own; they have studied the backstroke, the 
breaststroke, the crawl, and the butterfly, but they haven’t spent any time in the wa-
ter.”). 
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fit within the formal legal schema.31  In short, graduates exit law 
school thinking like students rather than professionals.32 
This is by no means a novel observation.  The American Bar As-
sociation’s 1992 MacCrate Report similarly faulted law schools in the 
key areas of lawyering skills and professionalism, as the Carnegie Report 
acknowledges.33  But the Carnegie Report brings to light an important 
additional dimension to the problem: the lack of integration between 
law schools’ existing instruction in skills and professionalism and the 
core cognitive apprenticeship that dominates students’ legal educa-
tion.34  A hallmark of the successful professional is the ability to inte-
grate and bring to bear multiple competencies—expert knowledge, 
practical experience, and moral judgment—in circumstances of un-
certainty and complexity.  In this way, efforts to invigorate training in 
skills and professionalism through a strategy of adding supplemental 
courses, the dominant institutional response to the MacCrate Report, 
have missed the mark.35  According to the Carnegie Report, what is 
needed is an “integrative” rather than “additive” approach to curricu-
lar reform, one that appreciates and imparts the holistic nature of 
professional expertise.36 
B. The Transactional Thinking Gap 
So far, so good.  But what are the essential skills and practical 
knowledge that must be integrated into the doctrinal curriculum?  
The Carnegie Report, as a study in teaching and learning, is principally 
 31 As the Carnegie Report explains, the case dialogue method is a “deliberate sim-
plification . . . [consisting] in the abstraction of the legally relevant aspects of situa-
tions and persons from their everyday contexts. . . . By contrast, the task of connect-
ing . . . [legal] conclusions with the rich complexity of actual situations that involve 
full-dimensional people, let alone the job of thinking through the social conse-
quences or ethical aspects of the conclusions, remains outside the method.”  THE 
CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 187. 
 32 Id. at 188 (“The result [of the lack of direct training in professional practice] is 
to prolong and reinforce the habits of thinking like a student rather than an appren-
tice practitioner . . . .”). 
 33 Id. at 189. 
 34 See id. at 58–59 (noting that while “practical courses in lawyering and clinical-
legal education make an essential contribution to responsible professional training . . 
. [b]ecause case-dialogue teaching is seldom explicitly connected with clinical teach-
ing, few law schools achieve the full impact that an integrated ensemble [experience] 
could provide”). 
 35 See id. at 189–90. The Carnegie Report favorably excepts particular initiatives at a 
few schools including New York University and City University of New York.  Id. at 
197.  Another important counter-example is the Integrative Transactional Program 
at Temple University.  See Myers supra note 6, at 406–07 (describing Temple’s pro-
gram). 
 36 THE CARNEGIE Report, supra note 1, at 191. 
ARNOW-RICHMAN (FINAL) 4/6/2009  11:12:21 PM 
456 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:447 
 
concerned with assessing the existing pedagogy of legal education 
and recommending sites of reform.  It tells us relatively little about 
what an integrative curriculum actually looks like, and even less about 
the content of any of its components. 
Yet the Carnegie Report does not write on a clean slate.  Its under-
standing of the apprenticeship of practice is informed by what is cur-
rently taught in the prototypical law school curriculum.  That curricu-
lum, as reflected both in its cognitive dimensions and its modest 
practical components, has long espoused a particular view of the law-
yer—as an advocate whose principal function is to advance legal 
rights and defend legal positions in the context of an existing or im-
minent dispute.37  The analytical processes associated with case expli-
cation and legal argument—the aspects of professional competence 
that the Carnegie Report credits schools with successfully imparting—
are the building blocks for an advocacy practice.  In the event of liti-
gation (or adjudication in an alternative forum), the lawyer will apply 
these analytical processes to such things as drafting a brief, preparing 
a position statement, arguing a motion or appeal, or crafting a clos-
ing argument.  In the event of negotiation and settlement, the same 
competencies are transferable to valuing the case (which is depend-
ent on the likelihood of success on the merits if adjudicated) and 
persuading opposing counsel of one’s position (which requires deliv-
ering many of the same arguments that would be made at such a pro-
ceeding).38 
The problem with the advocacy perspective is not, as some have 
put it, that most cases are not litigated, but rather that most “cases” 
are not cases.  The daily work of a transactional lawyer involves struc-
turing deals and drafting documents.  Rather than dealing with dis-
putes, he or she architects relationships.  While there is some consen-
sus within the legal academy that law schools do a reasonable job of 
preparing students in the advocacy tradition, it is widely agreed that 
law schools do little to groom students for their roles as counselors in 
 37 See Tina L. Stark, Thinking Like a Deal Lawyer, 54 J. LEGAL. EDUC. 223, 223 
(2004) (“Although the academy prides itself on teaching students to think like a law-
yer, for the most part we teach students to think like litigators.”).  I use the term “ad-
vocate” rather than litigator to embrace any and all aspects of a lawyer’s practice that 
involve a dispute, even if the problem does not lead to litigation. 
 38 Id. at 224 (“[In first-year courses] we teach students to take the law and apply it 
to the facts to create a persuasive argument.  That argument is then memorialized in 
a brief or a memo or is otherwise used to sway another, be it the other party or the 
court.”). 
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a planning and compliance-oriented practice.39  This long-standing 
neglect suffuses the curriculum as a whole and, by some accounts, is 
worsening.  Since the mid-1960s, there has been a documented drop 
in law schools’ doctrinal offerings in the field of commercial law, 
which, along with corporate law courses, is widely viewed as the core 
of a substantive transactional curriculum.40  Commercial law scholar-
ship also is decreasing in prevalence and, according to some, has suf-
fered a decline in prestige.41  The number of faculty with expertise in 
the area is dwindling; many are nearing retirement and few newcom-
ers to the legal academy are taking up the field.42  Faced with the in-
ability to staff the three core courses of a vibrant commercial law cur-
riculum—sales, secured transactions, and payment systems—law 
schools have struggled with the viability of a general commercial law 
course touching on all three.43 
The situation is even bleaker on the “skills” side of the curricu-
lum.  Whereas doctrinal offerings are evaporating, practice-oriented 
courses and clinical offerings designed to train students as transac-
tional lawyers by-and-large never existed.  The development of clini-
cal education came on the heels of the “access to justice” movement 
of the late 1960s, and most clinics continue to focus on representing 
the indigent in public proceedings.44  Along the same lines, first-year 
writing courses typically create contextual opportunities for students 
to research cases and statutes, draft briefs and research memos, and 
prepare and participate in simulated oral arguments—all hallmark 
functions of a legal advocate.45  Many schools offer advanced lawyer-
ing skills courses as part of the upper-level elective curriculum; yet 
 39 See e.g., Paul Brest, The Responsibility of Law Schools: Educating Lawyers as Counsel-
ors and Problem Solvers, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 7 (1995); Fleischer, supra note 3, 
at 478 (noting that most law students will graduate without ever being exposed to 
transactional skills); Noble-Allgire, supra note 3, at 32–33 (urging more professors to 
incorporate skills training into traditional legal courses); Stark, supra note 9, at 232 
(noting that students have “little opportunity to get a thorough grounding in busi-
ness before they leave law school,” putting them “behind the curve” when they start 
deals practice). 
 40 See Garvin, supra note 6, at 412–13 & n.17. 
 41 Id. at 415–16. 
 42 Id. at 406–08 (comparing number of faculty in commercial law field to those in 
criminal law and intellectual property over a forty-year period). 
 43 Whether such compressed exposure offers a meaningful survey of the field is a 
question that has dogged commercial law faculty; and employment faculty consider-
ing the adoption of a comprehensive work law class might take heed. 
 44 Dauer, supra note 7, at 485 (“In a substantial number of schools, the clinic was 
first a way of pursuing social justice . . . and[,] secondly, an opportunity for teach-
ing.”); Fleischer, supra note 3, at 485. 
 45 See Schulze, supra note 6. 
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these are commonly concentrated in areas such as trial advocacy, ad-
vanced legal writing, and mediation and negotiation.  Certainly some 
of these courses benefit the student bound for transactional practice 
(negotiation, for instance, is an inter-disciplinary skill), but at many, 
if not most, law schools there are few to no courses geared toward de-
veloping transactional-specific competencies. 46 
Efforts to address the underselling of transactional law have gen-
erally reflected the additive model criticized in the Carnegie Report.  
Many propose or presume the existence of a skills-focused, non-
doctrinal course, such as a transactions “lab” or capstone experience 
in which students study real deal documents or execute simulated 
transactions.47  Such courses deserve praise for providing a contextual 
learning experience for students that approximates closely the actual 
practice of transactional law.48  But they cannot fill the deficit on their 
own.  As the Carnegie Report suggests, segregated instruction teaches 
students that practical skills are discrete from and secondary to the 
analytical apprenticeship and fails to construct the critical bridge be-
tween competencies essential to expert professional practice. 
Even more problematic in the context of the legal academy’s 
particular failures in transactional training, an additive approach 
leaves intact the existent doctrinal paradigm, which itself creates an 
untenable dichotomy between substantive transactional law and the 
mainstream doctrinal curriculum.  Just as law schools have compart-
mentalized skills and doctrine within their curriculum, they have also 
cultivated an informal divide between “public” and “private” law 
courses with business and commercial law frequently equated with 
the latter.  Such distinctions are questionable in the modern regula-
tory state, in which government intervention into all areas of human 
life, including business and commerce, is pervasive,49 and the pub-
lic/private divide has been widely criticized from a legal theory per-
 46 A notable exception is the Integrated Transactional Program at Temple Uni-
versity, which combines trusts and estates, professional responsibility, and transac-
tional skills training in a ten-credit, year-long program consisting of two to three cre-
dits of substantive law instruction and two to three credits of skills and simulations 
each semester.  See Myers, supra note 6, at 406–07.  This program is unique not only 
for its transactional focus, but for its efforts to truly integrate cognitive and applied 
learning.  See infra Part V.A. 
 47 See, e.g., Fleischer, supra note 3, at 490–92. 
 48 See id. at 492–93 (explaining that deals classes offer students a leg up by show-
ing them what business lawyers actually do). 
 49 It is worth noting that the trading of securities, which forms the backbone of 
our economy, is intensely regulated at the federal level and that, in response to the 
2007 collapse in the sub-prime mortgage market, a significant and more expansive 
regulatory overhaul of financial markets appears to be in the offing. 
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spective.50  It is more useful when planning curriculum, particularly 
skills instruction, to leave aside such theoretical concepts and focus 
on the kinds of skills and analysis on which different types of legal 
problems will draw—that is, whether a particular matter requires the 
lawyer to effectuate a client’s goal or intention ex ante, or whether it 
requires her to unravel the consequences of a particular interaction, 
which may or may not have been planned previously.51 
Viewed from this functional perspective, almost all legal disci-
plines lend themselves to both transactional and advocacy practice.  
Business and commercial transactions obviously give rise to litigated 
disputes.  Advocates as much as “deal” lawyers must know the substan-
tive law of real estate, secured transactions, business associations, and 
a host of other “private law” courses in dealing with the downstream 
consequences of preexisting transactions.  On the flip side, all areas 
of law, including those traditionally considered “public law” fields, 
provide a set of external rules and limitations that shape individual 
behavior and can be leveraged by lawyers in planning future transac-
tions.  Doctrinal faculty routinely ask students to craft arguments for 
the application of rules to existing disputes—an essential exercise in 
anticipation of preparing a brief or oral argument for a matter in liti-
gation.  Only rarely however, do they ask students to plot a course of 
action that will insulate a client from disputes ex ante.52  An ethically 
troubling hypothetical from a quintessentially public field offers a 
powerful example.  Imagine a high-level organized crime figure wish-
es to orchestrate a bank robbery.  Knowledgeable about criminal law 
and concerned about himself and other principals, he consults a law-
yer about how to best structure the heist so as to reduce the risk of 
criminal conspiracy liability.  While the rules of the profession and 
common sense dictate that no lawyer should provide this type of ad-
 50 Much of the criticism centers on the claim that “public” and “private” repre-
sent ideological labels rather than a substantive framework for analysis.  See Duncan 
Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 
1349, 1351–52 (1982).  For a critique of the distinction in the labor law context, see 
Karl E. Klare, The Public/Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1358, [PIN 
CITE] (1982). 
 51 See Myers, supra note 6, at 406 (describing the difference between a transac-
tional perspective and a more traditional litigation focus as looking at a legal matter 
“as it unfolds, not after it has become a problem”). 
 52 Cf. Stark, supra note 9, at 484 (noting that asking students questions such as 
“how the attorneys representing the parties in the case may have been able to avoid 
the dispute by better structuring and negotiating the terms of the transaction” and 
“how the parties could have drafted the legal documents for a more favorable ruling 
from the court being asked to give effect to their agreements” can achieve the goal of 
introducing basic transactional skills into a substantive property or real estate 
course). 
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vice, it may be fair to say that all lawyers should have the underlying 
skill set necessary to formulate it. 
In sum, the transactional thinking gap is about more than just 
skills and transactional courses.  What is missing from the curriculum 
is not merely the opportunity to draft documents or negotiate deals, 
but exposure to a transactional mindset—a framework for viewing 
the law as a factor in planning interactions and managing risk, rather 
than in resolving disputes and crafting arguments.  In other words, 
when it comes to preparation for transactional practice, law schools 
not only fail to provide a meaningful apprenticeship of practice, but 
they also fall short in developing its core analytical underpinnings.  In 
that recognition lie both a challenge and the hope of a cure.  Trans-
actional competency cannot evolve purely from skills instruction in a 
specialized course, but neither does it depend on the quality of a 
school’s substantive infrastructure for teaching business and com-
mercial law doctrine.  Put another way, any class—skills or doctrinal, 
public law or private law—has the potential to be an integrative 
“deals” class. 
C. Enhancing the Pedagogies of Knowledge and Practice:  
A Transactional Perspective 
To implement the teachings of the Carnegie Report with an eye 
toward rectifying the particular problems of law schools’ transactional 
curriculum requires some further explication of what transactional 
lawyers do and, more importantly, how they think.53  At the most ba-
sic level, the critical skills for successful business lawyering are the 
ability to understand transactions and prepare the corresponding 
deal documents.  Professor Tina Stark describes this competency as 
the ability to translate client needs into legal form, and her work sets 
out a viable pedagogy for teaching this skill.54  She proposes that stu-
dents learn to abstract deal-specific issues into five broader categories 
common to all business transactions—provisions related to money, 
risk, control, quality standards, and ending the deal55—and then use 
the “building blocks” of representations, warranties, covenants, and 
 53 Victor Fleischer has noted that students bound for business law practice “finish 
law school with only the vaguest notion of what they will be doing.”  Fleischer, supra 
note 3, at 492.  I fear that many law professors suffer from the same ignorance. 
 54 Stark, supra note 37, at 224 (“The lawyer must . . . find the contract concepts 
that best reflect the business deal and use those concepts as the basis of drafting the 
contract provisions.  I call this skill ‘translating the business deal into contract con-
cepts.’”). 
 55 Id. at 229–32 (describing five-prong framework for identifying business issues). 
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conditions to compose the requisite contract.56  This framework cap-
tures the core skill of drafting deal documents to memorialize a ne-
gotiated understanding, and it has the advantage of generalizing to 
all business and commercial transactions regardless of the substance 
of the deal. 
However, underlying those functions, there is also a critical ana-
lytical process that reaches beyond business and commercial practice 
altogether.  Transactional lawyering can be broadly understood to 
encompass the optimal structuring of private relationships, regardless 
of who the actors are and whether or not a written document flows 
from their arrangement.57  The scholarship of preventive law provides 
a theoretical groundwork for understanding the cognitive compo-
nent of this universal competency.  Perhaps best understood as a the-
ory of practice,58 preventive law emphasizes the lawyer’s role as a 
planner and facilitator.59  Her aim is to achieve the client’s goals in a 
way that enhances opportunities for gain and minimizes legal risk 
and other potential liabilities.60  From a preventive law perspective, 
the lawyer’s role is to generate options and facilitate choice rather 
than to advance a particular position.61  Preventive law is also dis-
tinctly proactive and client-centered.62  The model envisions the law-
yer and client jointly engaged in formulating a comprehensive legal 
strategy not limited to one earmarked issue, but contemplating long-
term risks and goals that are not strictly legal in nature.63 
 56 Id. at 225. 
 57 This description of transactional practice leaves aside for the moment the 
question of the value added by the lawyer in any particular structure, a subject that 
has received significant attention in transactional law scholarship.  See, e.g., Ronald 
Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239 
(1984).  Here, this Article’s aim is to link the work that transactional lawyers do to an 
underlying cognitive theory that can be taught in the classroom.  This Article returns 
to the concept of value added infra Part IV.C. 
 58 Cf. BOYER, supra note 8, at 21–23 (describing “the scholarship of application” as 
the process by which the scholar responsibly applies knowledge to consequential 
problems in furtherance of the goals of individuals and institutions, and allows social 
problems to define an agenda for scholarly investigation). 
 59 See Stolle et al., supra note 11. 
 60 Dauer, supra note 11, at 801 (“The objective of lawyers practicing [preventive 
law] has been to help their clients achieve their personal or organizational or familial 
or corporate goals, by optimizing the arrangements that are relevant to those goals 
and by minimizing the chance that the purpose is confounded with unnecessary legal 
risks.”). 
 61 Edward D. Re, The Lawyer as Counselor and the Prevention of Litigation, 31 CATH. 
U. L. REV. 685, 691–92 (1981) (“It is the counselor’s function to help clients make 
informed rational choices among alternative courses of conduct.”). 
 62 Stolle et al., supra note 11. 
 63 Id. 
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Owing in part to the influence of therapeutic jurisprudence on 
preventive law theory, these aspects of the practice are often framed 
in psychological terms.64  In particular, preventive law contemplates 
that legal disputes are animated by feelings of loss or injury occa-
sioned by a breach of expectation.65  Thus, to secure against risk, the 
preventive lawyer must predict human behavior as much as legal re-
sults.66  Along the same lines, the theory recognizes that legal tools 
are not the only, nor always the best, mechanisms of dispute avoid-
ance, and that personal intervention and creative problem solving are 
at times superior responses.67  In this respect, preventative law shares 
much in common with relational contract theory, which posits that 
contracting parties’ actions and expectations are strongly informed 
by relational norms, and that the precise terms of agreement serve 
primarily as a backstop in situations of relational breakdown.68  For all 
of these reasons, preventive law suggests that it rarely is efficient (and 
at times it is counterproductive) to attempt the elimination of all le-
gal risk.69 
These insights offer a useful framework for teaching the cogni-
tive dimensions of transactional lawyering.  They also address a key 
 64 Therapeutic jurisprudence is a body of scholarship concerned with the psycho-
logical consequences of legal rules and practice, it also has significant applications in 
the medical field.  Id. at 17 (describing therapeutic jurisprudence as “an interdisci-
plinary approach to law that builds on the basic insight that law is a social force that 
has inevitable (if unintended) consequences for the mental health and psychological 
functioning of those it affects.”).  The synergies between preventive law and thera-
peutic jurisprudence are explored in a number of articles.  See, e.g., Dauer, supra note 
11, at 801; Stolle et al., supra note 11, at 18–20; Dennis P. Stolle & David B. Wexler, 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Preventive Law: A Combined Concentration to Invigorate the 
Everyday Practice of Law, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 25, [PIN CITE] (1997). 
 65 See Edward A. Dauer, Four Principles for a Theory of Preventive Law, in A PROACTIVE 
APPROACH TO CONTRACTING AND LAW 17 (Helena Haapio ed., 2008). 
 66 Id. 
 67 See, e.g., id. at 28–30 (providing the example of a hospital that managed its risk 
of liability to transfusion patients who may have acquired Hepatitis from contami-
nated blood with a strategy based on “compassion, acceptance of responsibility . . .  
attention to immediate needs, full disclosure and never letting the patient feel aban-
doned” as less costly than pursuing vigorous negligence defenses in inevitable law-
suits). 
 68 The term “relational contract” refers to the notion that the behavior and ex-
pectations of contracting parties are heavily influenced by a desire to preserve their 
relationship and foster cooperative behavior.  See generally IAN MACNEIL, THE NEW 
SOCIAL CONTRACT (1980); Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract Theory in Context, 94 NW. 
U. L. REV. 737 (2000); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Con-
tracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089 (1981); Ian R. Macneil, Values in Contract: Internal and Exter-
nal, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 340 (1983).  The connection to preventive law is addressed in 
DAUER, supra note 65, at 24. 
 69 DAUER, supra note 65, at 27–28. 
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objection of the Carnegie Report to the current substantive pedagogy 
by acknowledging the role of non-legal needs and interests in client 
behavior and legitimizing them within the lawyer’s practice.70  Pre-
ventive theory humanizes transactional work.71  Its principles are as 
applicable to preparing a will or prenuptial agreement with an indi-
vidual client as to papering a commercial real estate transaction or a 
corporate merger or acquisition.  At the same time, preventive law 
recognizes that moral, personal, relational, and other non-legal, non-
financial concerns permeate all economic undertakings—including 
business transactions.  Most importantly, preventive law stresses the 
importance of creative foresight and problem solving that at times 
reaches outside the legal framework and ultimately may fall short of 
otherwise optimal legal solutions.  Thus, the foundational cognitive 
and applied skills of transactional practice, broadly construed, can be 
summarized as follows: the ability to uncover and understand multi-
dimensional goals and incentives; the ability to intuit areas of risk and 
foresee potential negative consequences, legal and behavioral; and 
finally, taking these considerations into account, the ability to exe-
cute the appropriate legal strategy, whether by contract drafting or 
other mechanisms. 
III. CLAIMING EMPLOYMENT LAW FOR THE TRANSACTIONAL  
LAW CURRICULUM (AND VICE VERSA) 
Part II argued that preparation for transactional practice must 
be a centerpiece of any curricular reform efforts in the wake of the 
Carnegie Report, and it outlined the type of skills and cognitive proc-
esses that must be transmitted to students.  The next step is to iden-
tify a means of integrating these components of professional training 
into the curriculum.  Ultimately, it is the contention of this Article 
that, consistent with its broad definition of transactional practice, 
such learning can and should take place in all manner of doctrinal 
courses.  However, employment law is one substantive area of law that 
is particularly suited to the task.  This Part explains why. 
It begins with a survey of the state of worklaw in the legal acad-
emy.  A significant decline in union density, coupled with the ascen-
dance of federal discrimination law, has resulted in uncertainty about 
the role of the basic employment law course in the current curricu-
lum, leaving the field fertile for a new organizing framework.  The 
 70 See supra Part II.A. 
 71 Dauer, supra note 7, at 484 (“[Students should] understand that even in com-
mercial matters people have real feelings about what they are doing and that feelings 
are just as much facts as widgets and dollars and documents are facts.”). 
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Part then turns to emerging developments in employment law doc-
trine, practice, and scholarship—all of which suggest the increasing 
importance of private planning in assessing rights and liabilities in 
the workplace.  Courts and scholars alike are examining employers’ 
compliance and prevention efforts, both as a litmus test for legal ob-
ligation and as a means of understanding the normative reach of the 
law.  It therefore makes sense for the employment law course simi-
larly to showcase the transactional aspects of the field.  This Part con-
cludes with a series of examples illustrating the prevalent role trans-
actional planning plays in employment practice and offers some 
cautionary words about integrating transactional skills while main-
taining a diversely focused and ideologically balanced course. 
A. From Labor Law to Worklaw: Trends in Teaching and Curriculum 
Employment law is facing a modest identity crisis.  Historically, 
the study of workplace relationships in the legal academy concen-
trated on the role of unions and collective action.  During the Lochner 
era and its aftermath, labor relations was the critical context in which 
constitutional questions about the reach of private contract were con-
tested.72  For this reason, the field was a foundation of the public law 
curriculum.73 
Since then, social and doctrinal developments have entirely al-
tered the legal landscape.  Unions represent a mere twelve percent of 
the workforce, and the majority of protections afforded by the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act are irrelevant to most workers.74  “Tradi-
tional” labor law, as it has come to be called, is an increasingly insular 
specialty, and employment lawyers can maintain a busy practice with-
 72 See Cynthia L. Estlund, Reflections on the Declining Prestige of American Labor Law 
Scholarship, 23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 789, 790 (2002) (“[L]abor law was the primary 
battleground for this great constitutional conflict, for legislative efforts to regulate 
the terms of the labor contract posed the most direct challenge to the reigning con-
stitutional construct of ‘liberty of contract.’”). 
 73 See id. at 791 (“[T]he Wagner Act and its constitutional vindication seemed to 
promise, and to some extent delivered, a just and peaceable resolution to ‘the labor 
question,’ which had plagued American society for generations.  There was no doubt 
that the scholars and the scholarship that played a part in bringing about that resolu-
tion were at the very center of the public agenda.”). 
 74 The 2008 statistics indicate that union member comprise 7.6 percent of private 
sector workers, 36.8 percent of public sector workers, and 12.4 percent of combined 
public and private sector workers.  Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of La-
bor Statistics, Union Members in 2008, at 1 (Jan. 28, 2009) available at 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf. 
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out ever handling a labor law case or even referencing that body of 
law.75 
This invites questions about the best way to package employment 
law instruction for students aspiring to the field.  Notably, labor law 
itself has not changed; indeed, the absence of any meaningful reform 
to the labor law architecture is perhaps the principal complaint of 
contemporary labor law scholars.76  Thus, to the extent it continues to 
be offered,77 the traditional labor law course does not necessarily re-
quire significant reform.78  Rather, what is needed is an organizing 
principle for the ever-growing body of law that has developed outside 
of the labor law regime, as well as a means of relating it to its histori-
cal foundations.79 
The legal academy’s response to this challenge was, in most cas-
es, the development of a stand-alone employment law course and, 
subsequently, the spinning off of antidiscrimination law into yet an-
other specialized employment law class.80  This has worked well 
enough for teaching antidiscrimination law, which comprises a dis-
crete set of statutes all embracing common doctrinal proof structures 
and recurring themes.  The problem, which is well known to those 
who teach in the area, is what to do with the remaining body of em-
ployment law, which is anything but discrete.  In contrast to tradi-
 75 See Steven L. Willborn, Labor Law Without Labor, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 547, 548 
(1988) (reviewing MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT 
LAW (1987)) (“[T]he labor law that is important outside of the law schools is labor 
law without labor—laws regulating wages and hours, providing for workers’ and un-
employment compensations, prohibiting employment discrimination, protecting 
pension benefits, and so forth. . . . [L]abor law without labor, employment law, is the 
next wave of the future.”). 
 76 See Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1527, 1530 (2002). 
 77 Many have lamented the decline of student enrollment as well as course offer-
ings in traditional labor law.  See, e.g., Orly Lobel, The Four Pillars of Work Law, 104 
MICH. L. REV. 1539, 1550 (2005). 
 78 This is not to suggest that innovation is absent or unwelcome.  Several faculty, 
for instance, have experimented successfully with simulated workplace organizing 
and unfair labor practices litigation in the traditional course.  See generally Roberto 
Corrada, A Simulation of Union Organizing in a Labor Law Class, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 445 
(1996); C. John Cicero, The Classroom as Shop Floor: Images of Work and the Study of La-
bor Law, 20 VT. L. REV. 117 (1995). 
 79 See Willborn, supra note 75, at 549. 
 80 This move dates roughly to the appearance of the first employment law text-
books in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  See, e.g., SAMUEL ESTREICHER & MICHAEL C. 
HARPER, CASES AND MATERIAL ON THE LAW GOVERNING THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 
(1st ed. 1990); MATTHEW A. FINKIN ET AL., LEGAL PROTECTION FOR THE INDIVIDUAL 
EMPLOYEE (1st ed. 1989); MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
EMPLOYMENT LAW (1st ed. 1987); STEVEN  L. WILLBORN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES 
AND MATERIALS (1st ed. 1993). 
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tional labor and even employment discrimination, general employ-
ment law comprises an amalgam of federal and state statutes and 
common-law principles that differ widely in scope, coverage, and 
purpose.81  Thus, the professor teaching basic employment law faces 
difficult coverage choices (particularly for the course that aspires to 
include a survey of antidiscrimination law), as well as a significant pe-
dagogical challenge: the patchwork of laws in play is not easily shep-
herded into an integrated thematic structure.82 
Recently, faculty in the field have speculated on the value of a 
holistic approach to the study of “worklaw”—traditional labor law, an-
tidiscrimination law, and employment law—that integrates some por-
tion of the doctrine and of these areas with the policy considerations 
common to all three.83  As a curricular choice, such an approach 
promises to solve the thematic weaknesses of the stand-alone em-
ployment law course model.  Placing employment law and labor law 
side-by-side allows the course to be structured around the choice of 
individual versus collective action and the competing legal regimes 
 81 See Estlund, supra note 72, at 798 (“[T]he bulk of employment law is a bit of a 
hodgepodge, as anyone who has taught employment law will concede.”); Willborn, 
supra note 75, at 549 (“[E]mployment law has no natural organizing principle. There 
is no central, federal source of employment law.  Instead, employment law is found 
in hundreds, if not thousands, of separate statutes and cases.”). 
 82 Dean Steven Willborn, lamenting this problem, offers a plentiful array of or-
ganizing themes in his review of the Rothstein and Liebman text.  See Willborn, supra 
note 75, at 551–53.  However, he also notes significant drawbacks for each proposal.  
Id. 
 83 See, e.g., Richard M. Fischl, Rethinking the Tripartite Division of American Work 
Law, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 163, 169–70 (2007); Lobel, supra note 77, at 1549–
53.  The coverage choices of some recent casebooks reflect this view.  For example, 
one text notes: 
This casebook’s point of departure comes from . . . the view that the 
study of federal labor legislation . . . must not be separated from the 
study of . . . state and federal law that regulates individual employment 
relations.  Instead of studying labor and employment law as separate 
regimes . . . we will examine how the legal discourses of collective bar-
gaining and employment law relate, or should relate, to give rise to 
what we shall call ‘Work Law.’ 
KENNETH M. CASEBEER & GARY MINDA, WORK LAW IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 3–4 (2005).  
Another casebook states: 
Understanding the story behind the decline of labor unions and labor 
law provides critical assistance in evaluating new employee representa-
tion systems and conceptualizing rights.  A comprehensive study of the 
law of work also provides an opportunity to critically [MISSING 
WORD] what form enforcement of rights should take . . . .  Accord-
ingly, we have denominated this text WorkLaw and endeavor here to 
present basic material on each system of labor market regulation. 
MARION CRAIN, ET AL., WORKLAW: CASES AND MATERIALS xiii–xiv (2005). 
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that attach to that decision.84  It also allows students to experience the 
process of thinking across doctrinal boundaries as they must inevita-
bly do in practice.85 
But what may be gained thematically is likely to be offset logisti-
cally.  It is difficult if not impossible to see how an instructor can 
meaningfully cover labor, antidiscrimination, and general employ-
ment law in a single course.86  If such courses do take root, it seems 
likely that they will serve merely as overviews—courses for students 
seeking a taste of the field—or as gateways to more advanced study.87  
If so, the question remains: what is the significance of the stand alone 
employment law course, and what value does it add to the law school 
curriculum? 
B. The Power of Private Ordering in the Modern  
Employment Relationship 
This Article offers the theme of relationship planning as a coor-
dinating approach to the stand alone employment law course.  At the 
end of this Part, I will detail the extensive ways in which both em-
ployee- and management-side employment law practice call for the 
application of transactional skills and thinking.  Before turning to 
those examples, however, it is necessary to lay the basis for this devel-
opment. 
In recent decades, there has been increased attention to private 
ordering in the identification and realization of employee rights and 
employer obligations.88  Judicial decisions at the state and federal lev-
 84 See Lobel, supra note 77, at 1552–53. 
 85 See Fischl, supra note 83, at 168. 
 86 Willborn, supra note 75, at 549 (noting that “[s]tructuring employment law as 
the core labor law offering[,] [including elements of employment discrimination 
and collective labor law,] risks even more superficial coverage of the three major top-
ics”).  It should be noted that recent “worklaw” texts, while offering a more holistic 
view of the law, do not necessarily purport to provide complete coverage of all three 
major areas of concentration.  See, e.g., CRAIN, supra note 83, at xiv–xv (“This book 
will be most useful in Employment Law courses that address [individual rights].  We 
advert to Labor Law principles . . . throughout the book, but at a policy level rather 
than a doctrinal level . . . and make no effort here to provide a satisfactory substitute 
for a Labor Law text.”). 
 87 This is precisely what has happened with the commercial law curriculum at 
some schools that now offer a general Uniform Commercial Code course purporting 
to cover sales, payment systems, and secured transactions. 
 88 See Roberto L. Corrada, Claiming Private Law For The Left: Exploring Gilmer's Im-
pact And Legacy, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1051, 1055  (1996) (finding “evidence of a New 
Private Law shift in the employment and labor law arena” based on Supreme Court 
decisions on pre-employment arbitration agreements and union access to private 
property); Estlund, supra note 18, at 322 (describing the move toward “self-
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el appear willing to credit employer policies and practices and defer 
to their contract documents in limiting liability and defining em-
ployee rights.  At the same time, employment law scholarship is grow-
ing increasingly sensitive to the role employers’ internal practices 
play in the realization of the goals of workplace law.89  Both trends re-
flect the critical importance of private choices, made principally by 
employers, in planning and structuring work relationships and per-
sonnel practices. 
This Part will consider these interrelated developments.  It be-
gins by examining the shift to private law in modern employment law 
jurisprudence.  It then details the emergence of an increasingly “le-
galist” approach to human resources management90 and the corre-
sponding rise of a “new institutionalist” movement in employment 
law scholarship.91 
1. Judicial Deference and the Emerging Private Law 
Jurisprudence 
Work law in its primordial form of labor law was a shared space 
for public and private impulses—a system premised on minimal pub-
lic intervention with the aim of facilitating private agreement on fair 
terms.92  In the latter half of the twentieth century, the field took a 
turn toward the public law model with the development of a variety of 
common-law causes of action designed to preserve job security93 as 
regulation” that brings “the locus of enforcement of both rights and regulations in-
side the firm or under the firm’s control”); Lobel, supra note 18, at 344 (2004) (de-
scribing the “shift from a regulatory to a governance model” that “challeng[es] the 
traditional focus on formal regulation as the dominant locus of change”). 
 89 See generally Arnow-Richman, Worker Mobility, supra note 15; Arnow-Richman, 
supra note 18; Lauren B. Edelman et al., Diversity Rhetoric and the Managerialization of 
Law, 106 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY. 1589 (2001); Edelman, supra note 18; Estlund, supra note 
18; Schultz, supra note 16; Sturm, supra note 18; Travis, supra note 17; infra Part 
III.B.2. 
 90 Fischl, supra note 83, at 204. 
 91 See Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family 
Caregivers Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 77, 120 
(2003) (describing “new institutionalism” as the argument that “‘the legal environ-
ment affects organizational policies and practices’ and that the law’s ‘practical mean-
ing is, to a large degree, determined within organizational fields rather than by offi-
cial law-makers.’”). 
 92 See generally Klare, supra note 50. 
 93 See, e.g., Pugh v. See’s Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 925–26 (Ct. App. 1981) 
(recognizing viability of contractual claim to job security based on company prac-
tices, personal assurances, and industry practices); Fortune v. Nat’l Cash Register, 
364 N.E.2d 1251, 1255–56 (Mass. 1977) (recognizing claim for breach of duty of 
good faith based on termination for purposes of avoiding payment of earned com-
missions); Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1267 (N.J. 1985) 
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well as extensive legislative activity aimed at eliminating status dis-
crimination.94  In the last few decades, however, the pendulum has 
swung the other way.  In assessing both common law and statutory 
rights, courts have demonstrated increased deference to private or-
dering—assigning legal significance to employer polices and prac-
tices, as well as their formal written agreements—often to the detri-
ment of workers. 
On the state level, this trend can be seen in the emerging com-
mon-law jurisprudence of job security claims.  A key judicial innova-
tion of the 1980s was the recognition of a cause of action for an em-
ployer’s breach of an implied-in-fact “just cause” contract based on a 
combination of employer policies, practices and assurances.95  In re-
cent years, however, courts are visibly reining in these claims, most 
notably by awarding summary judgment to employers based on em-
ployer-drafted language disclaiming any promise to job security.  The 
legal significance of disclaimers was acknowledged in tandem with 
the recognition of job security claims based on employee hand-
books.96  But while many early decisions closely scrutinized such lan-
guage for consistency with other terms and practices,97 increasingly 
courts seem willing to rubberstamp disclaimer language without re-
gard to contrary evidence, such as oral representations and other 
management actions that might reasonably instill expectations of 
continued employment on the part of workers.98  Such disclaimers 
(recognizing viability of contractual claim to job security based on personnel manu-
als);  Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512, 515 (Or. 1975) (recognizing tort claim based on 
termination for a “socially undesirable motive” in case of worker terminated for jury 
service).  See also Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A His-
torical Review and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REV. 351 (2002) (describing the com-
mon-law trend recognizing wrongful discharge claims); Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful 
Discharge Protections in an At-Will World, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1655 (1995) (same). 
 94 See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703, 78 Stat. 241, 255 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006)); Americans with Disabilities Act 
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
12101–13 (2006)); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-
202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (2006)).  See generally 
Estlund, supra note 18, at 331–32 (describing this trend). 
 95 See, e.g., Pugh, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 925–27; Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1267. 
 96 See Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1271. 
 97 See generally Stephen F. Befort, Employee Handbooks and the Legal Effect of Disclaim-
ers, 13 INDUS. REL. L.J. 326, 351–67 (1992) (describing judicial approaches to effec-
tiveness of disclaimers). 
 98 See, e.g., Grossman v. Computer Curriculum Corp., 131 F. Supp. 2d 299, 305–06 
(D. Conn. 2000); Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1094–95 (Cal. 2000); 
Rowe v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 473 N.W.2d 268, 271 (Mich. 1991); Finch v. Farm-
ers Co-op Oil Co. of Sheridan, 109 P.3d 537, 541–42 (Wyo. 2005).  See generally Jona-
than Fineman, The Inevitable Demise of the Implied Employment Contract [PIN CITE] 
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appear with increasing frequency not only in employee handbooks, 
but in offer letters, job applications, expense reimbursement forms, 
and a host of other employer-drafted personnel documents.99 
This type of deference to private action is not limited to com-
mon-law claims grounded in contract.  A related trend can be dis-
cerned in the area of employment law most explicitly associated with 
the public law/civil rights model: antidiscrimination law.  In the last 
two decades, the Supreme Court of the United States, through its de-
cisions on both arbitration agreements and sexual harassment claims, 
has signaled a turn in favor of private dispute resolution and private 
ordering generally.  In Gilmer v. Interstate and Circuit City v. Adams, the 
Court held that employment contracts are subject to the Federal Ar-
bitration Act and that an employee’s agreement to arbitrate does not 
constitute a waiver of federal statutory rights.100  These decisions allow 
employers to insist on ex ante agreements to submit any employment 
claims, including those arising under federal discrimination statutes, 
to private resolution.101  During the same period, the Court decided 
Ellerth v. Burlington and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, which estab-
lished an affirmative defense to vicarious liability in sexual harass-
(Univ. of Colo. Law Sch. Legal Studies Research, Paper No. 07-25, 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1015136 (describing this judicial trend in favor of employ-
ers as the inevitable result of reliance on contract law, which allows the party with 
stronger bargaining power to draft away the possibility of implied protections).  Em-
pirical research demonstrates that most workers incorrectly believe they are pro-
tected against arbitrary dismissal even when presented with an employer’s reservation 
of rights to terminate without cause in a personnel manual.  See, e.g., Pauline T. Kim, 
Norms, Learning, and Law: Exploring the Influences on Workers’ Legal Knowledge, 1999 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 447, 447 (1999); see also Cynthia Estlund, How Wrong are Employees About 
Their Rights, and Why Does it Matter?, 77 N.Y. U. L. REV. 6, 9–11 (2002) (summarizing 
and discussing Professor Kim’s data). 
 99 See, e.g., Ohanian v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc, 779 F.2d 101, 104 (2d Cir. 1985) 
(disclaimer appearing in a reimbursement form); Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc., 
139 P.3d 56, 58 (Cal. 2006) (disclaimer appearing in an offer letter); Nieves v. Bell 
Indus., 204 Mich. App. 459, 461–62 (Ct. App. 1994) (job application and compensa-
tion agreement containing a disclaimer); Barnell v. Taubman Co., 203 Mich. App. 
110, 113 (Ct. App. 1993) (“memorandum” distributed to workforce as a disclaimer). 
 100 Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001) (holding employment con-
tracts to be subject to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14 (2006), and not 
excluded under exception for railroad workers, seamen, and other workers engaged 
in commerce); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991) 
(holding that the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14 (2006), compelled en-
forcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreement between stock broker and New York 
Stock Exchange). 
 101 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35 (distinguishing prior decision in Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), and holding that a collective bargaining agreement 
could not preclude plaintiff from bringing statutory discrimination claims in federal 
court). 
ARNOW-RICHMAN (FINAL) 4/6/2009  11:12:21 PM 
2009] EMPLOYMENT AS TRANSACTION 471 
 
ment claims based largely on employer policies and practices.102  Un-
der these cases, the employer can successfully avoid liability if it shows 
that it implemented measures to prevent and respond to harassment, 
which the plaintiff unreasonably failed to utilize.103  District and ap-
pellate courts applying the Ellerth/Faragher doctrine have since 
treated employers’ sexual harassment policies as a (if not the) critical 
factual element in determining whether a worker’s claim will survive 
summary judgment.104  Considering the arbitration and harassment 
decisions together, employers are in a position to reduce the likeli-
hood that claims will arise through preventive measures, to limit the 
likelihood of liability by responding appropriately, and to ensure that 
in the event a claim arises it we be resolved in a pre-designated forum 
of their own choosing. 
2. Employers as Legal Actors and the Rise of New 
Institutionalism 
Employers are savvy to the power of planning.  No stranger to 
the risks and obligations associated with employment, they have long 
relied on individually negotiated written instruments when hiring 
upper echelon employees to limit the likelihood of loss or liability.105  
Executive contracts generally structure the flow of compensation and 
establish termination protocols that both incentivize desirable worker 
behavior and protect the company in the event the relationship 
sours.106 
What is changing is employers’ expanded focus on rank-and-file 
personnel issues as a critical front in the battle to minimize legal 
 102 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca 
Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
 103 Specifically, the employer will avoid liability where it can prove: (1) that it “ex-
ercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing be-
havior”; and (2) that the “employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any pre-
ventative or corrective opportunities provided by the employer,” or otherwise avoid 
harm.  Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; see also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. 
 104 See David Sherwyn et al., Don’t Train Your Employees and Cancel Your “1-800” Har-
assment Hotline: An Empirical Examination and Correction of the Flaws in the Affirmative 
Defense to Sexual Harassment Charges, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1283 (2001) (finding 
existence of a sexual harassment policy containing the requisite judicially articulated 
provisions to be the only factor statistically predicting an award of summary judg-
ment in employer’s favor). 
 105 See Stewart Schwab & Randall Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment 
Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For? 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 231, 246–57 
(2006) (describing content of such agreements). 
 106 See id. at 246–54. 
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risk.107  Human resources departments and in-house counsel offices 
have proliferated and, with them, businesses’ reliance on contractual 
documents and formal policies imposed across the workforce.108  
Companies now frequently require workers at all levels to sign a host 
of standard forms, including such things as agreements to arbitrate, 
waivers of employment status, acknowledgements of at-will status, 
noncompetition agreements and other restrictive covenants.109  Simi-
larly, it has become standard practice for large companies to main-
tain anti-harassment and discrimination policies, internal dispute 
resolution mechanisms, and other best practices and procedures for 
handling worker complaints and requests.110 
  Scholars of employment law are taking note as well.  Borrow-
ing from the teachings of social science and organizational theory, a 
body of “new institutionalist” scholarship has claimed the practices 
and policies of employers as key components in the social under-
standing, effectiveness, and, ultimately, the content of workplace reg-
ulation.111  Professor Laura Edelman’s managerialization-of-law theory 
teaches that the way in which employers respond to and implement 
legal mandates often reflects managerial values distinct from (and at 
times counter to) the goals of the laws themselves.112  Thus, employers 
have implemented internal dispute resolution programs that tend to 
 107 See Adele Nicholas, GCs Reveal Their Litigation Fears and Headaches, CORP. LEGAL 
TIMES, Oct. 2004, at 72 (indicating that 62 percent of surveyed general counsel 
ranked labor and employment litigation as their number one potential exposure).  
Further evidence of the increased concern about personnel matters as a serious 
business issue is a recent trend toward seeking business executives to serve in key 
human resources positions.  See Erin White, HR Departments Get New Star Power at Some 
Firms: Business Executives Now Tapped to Lead as Job is Rethought, WALL ST. J., June 23, 
2008, at B6. 
 108 See Edelman & Suchman, supra note 17, at 953–57; Estlund, supra note 18, at 
335–38; Sturm, supra note 18, at 527–30. 
 109 See, e.g., Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 120 F.3d 1006, 1010 (9th Cir. 1997) (en 
banc) (workers required to sign document providing that worker was “an Independ-
ent Contractor” and nothing in the agreement should be construed as creating an 
“employer-employee relationship”). On the prevalence of noncompete and arbitra-
tion agreements, see generally Arnow-Richman, Rise of Delayed Term, supra note 15; 
Arnow-Richman, Worker Mobility, supra note 15; and Cynthia Estlund, Between Rights 
and Contract: Arbitration Agreements and Non-Compete Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Em-
ployment Law, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 379 (2006). 
 110 See generally Richard A. Bales, Normative Consideration of Employment Arbitration at 
Gilmer’s Quinceañera, 81 TUL. L. REV. 331 (2006) (describing arbitration agreements); 
Shultz, supra note 16, 2103–19 (describing sexual harassment policies). 
 111 See, e.g., Williams & Segal, supra note 91, at 120 (describing “new institutional-
ism” as the argument that “‘the legal environment affects organizational policies and 
practices’ and that the law’s ‘practical meaning is, to a large degree, determined 
within organizational fields rather than by official law-makers’”). 
 112 See generally Edelman et al., supra note 89. 
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focus on conflict management more than the legal rights of ag-
grieved workers.113  Similarly, their antidiscrimination and harassment 
policies have frequently targeted consensual workplace relationships 
and non-harassing sexual behavior consistent with management’s in-
terest in maintaining a strict and productive work environment as 
well as its desire to avoid liability associated with unwelcome sexual 
harassment.114 
This process has both risks and advantages to would-be plaintiffs.  
In the area of harassment, where employer policies have become an 
explicit component of the vicarious liability rule, scholars have ex-
pressed concern that a system of “paper compliance” will overtake 
genuine efforts to eradicate workplace harassment.115  A stream of 
federal court decisions finding in favor of employers on the basis of 
paper polices gives credence to these fears.116  Yet employer efforts at 
liability avoidance in other contexts, most notably under the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act (ADA), appear to point in the other direc-
tion.  Business compliance literature and existing empirical research 
suggest that employers may be over-complying with the law—
accommodating workers that, until recently,117 would not have met 
 113 Lauren B. Edelman et al., Internal Dispute Resolution: The Transformation of Civil 
Rights in the Workplace, 27 LAW SOC’Y REV 497, 511–12 (1993) (suggesting that em-
ployers may use internal discrimination complaint resolution mechanisms more for 
purposes of advancing a managerial goal of ensuring smooth employee relations 
than for vindicating legal rights); Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic 
Structures: Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM J. SOCIOLOGY 1531, 1545–
47 (1992). 
 114 See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 16, at 2090–94 (explaining how the proscription 
against workplace sexual harassment has been interpreted by employers as consistent 
with an ideal of a sanitized workplace focused on productivity and divorced from pas-
sion and emotion). 
 115 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination 
Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 24–25 (2006); Margaret S. Stockdale et al., Coming to Terms 
with Zero Tolerance Sexual Harassment Policies, 4 J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. PRAC. 65, 97 
(2004) (warning of the likelihood of mere symbolic compliance by employers). 
 116 See Bagenstos, supra note 115, at 25–26 (“Under the prevailing approach, em-
ployers can avoid liability for harassment simply by adopting and distributing poli-
cies. . . . This is true even absent any indication that the process set up by the em-
ployer has been effective at that or any other workplace.”); Sherwyn et al., supra note 
104, at 1283–85 (finding the existence of a sexual harassment policy containing the 
requisite judicially articulated provisions to be the only factor to statistically predict 
an award of summary judgment in an employer’s favor). 
 117 Under the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, which became effective January 1, 
2009, Congress expanded the definition of “disability” to include a variety of im-
pairments that might not previously have been protected under the Act, such as epi-
sodic impairments, impairments alleviated by mitigating measures, impairments af-
fecting only the ability to perform one’s job, and impairments to bodily systems that 
do not necessarily manifest in one’s performance of life activities.  See 42 U.S.C. § 
12102; Alex B. Long, Introducing the New and Improved Americans with Disabilities Act: 
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the legal definition of disability and providing accommodations be-
yond what the law considers reasonable and necessary—in an effort 
to avoid liability.118 
This Article is not the place to debate the role that employer 
compliance efforts should play in judicial assessment of liability or 
the merits of the private turn in employment law generally.  I have 
discussed these questions in other contexts, as have many others.119  
Rather, the point is that the choices employers (and to a lesser extent 
employees120) make at the outset of and during the course of their re-
lationship have significant legal ramifications.  The reach and scope 
of workplace policies and the nature of employer responses to em-
ployee requests and workplace disputes often determine whether a 
claim will arise, where it will be resolved, and, ultimately, whether li-
ability will result. 
C. The Employment Lawyer as Transaction Planner and Business 
Decision Maker 
The previously described common-law and statutory develop-
ments both reflect and require a change in the nature of employ-
ment practice.  Given the prominent role of federal discrimination 
claims in employment law, practitioners in the field have often been 
thought of principally as litigators.  From this perspective, employee-
side lawyers serve as public advocates, vindicating workers’ rights 
though the administrative and court systems, while management law-
yers act principally in a responsive role, defending managerial inter-
Assessing The ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 103 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) 
(manuscript at 2–8, on file with author) (summarizing the 2008 changes to the 
ADA’s definition of “disability”). 
 118 See Sharona Hoffman, Settling the Matter: Does Title I of the ADA Work?, 59 ALA. L. 
REV. 305, 333, 335, 338 (2008); Helen A. Schartz et al., Workplace Accommodations: Em-
pirical Study of Current Employees, 75 MISS. L.J. 917, 939, 941–42 (2006); Travis, supra 
note 17, at 44–55. 
 119 For a critical perspective on the role of employer policies and practices on 
worker rights, see generally Bagenstos, supra note 115; Susan Bisom-Rapp, Discerning 
Form from Substance: Understanding Employer Litigation Prevention Strategies, 3 EMP. RTS. & 
EMP. POL'Y J. 1 (1999); and Schultz, supra note 16.  For expressions of cautious opti-
mism about the value of internal employer compliance efforts, see generally Arnow-
Richman, supra note 18 (benefits to working caregivers); Stephen F. Befort, Accom-
modation at Work: Lessons from the Americans with Disabilities Act and Possibilities for Allevi-
ating the American Worker Time Crunch, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 615 (2004) (bene-
fits to disabled workers); and Orly Lobel, Interlocking Regulatory and Industrial 
Relations: The Governance of Workplace Safety, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 1071 (2005) (workplace 
safety compliance).  For a roadmap to enhancing the oversight and effectiveness of 
self-regulatory efforts by employers, see Estlund, supra note 18, at 377–83. 
 120 I take up the role of transactional planning in representing workers infra Part 
III.C.2. 
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ests and seeking to limit employment rights through favorable judi-
cial ruling. 
The pedagogy of employment law courses generally caters to this 
civil rights model of employment practice, and not without some le-
gitimacy.  Employment discrimination litigation cases have continued 
their upward spiral since the passage of the 1991 Civil Rights Act and 
comprise approximately ten percent of the federal bench’s case 
docket.121  Law firms also embed this model in their firm structure.  
Employment practice groups often developed and continue to be si-
tuated under the umbrella of their firm’s litigation department. 
Yet the developments previously described require employment 
lawyers to assume a stronger preventive role, particularly (though not 
exclusively) those who advise management on employment issues.  
The frontline in employment practice is no longer the dispositive 
motion stage, nor even the pre-litigation phase, of a dispute.  It is a 
point in time well in advance of any dispute, often in advance of hire, 
when the lawyer structures the intended work relationship, or influ-
ences that structure, in a way that best meets the client’s needs.  For 
this reason, it would be a mistake to continue viewing the practice of 
employment law as a litigator’s domain. Transactional training—the 
analytical approach and practical skills employed in planning and 
counseling clients—must be a significant component of any employ-
ment law course.  To that end, this Part describes how and where 
transactional teaching moments arise in employment law and prac-
tice, as well as what their inclusion means in terms of the ideology of 
the classroom. 
1. Identifying Drafting and Planning Opportunities 
From the employer’s perspective, there are two main areas of 
employment practice that offer synergies with the goals of the trans-
actional curriculum: drafting contracts between the company and its 
workers and developing policies on behalf of management.  Man-
agement lawyers routinely draft a host of contract documents, includ-
ing pre-dispute arbitration agreements, severance and release agree-
ments, independent contractor agreements, and noncompetes and 
other restrictive covenants.  They are frequently involved in the de-
velopment or revision of written policies on such matters as parental 
leave, disability, nondiscrimination and harassment, internal and ex-
ternal dispute resolution, and discipline and termination procedures. 
 121 See Kevin M. Clermont et al., How Employment-Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in the 
Federal Courts Of Appeals, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 547, 548 (2003). 
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The following scenarios illustrate how such matters arise in prac-
tice: 
1. A software company is considering developing a database 
product in the competitive market of medical office 
technology.  Its workers are highly skilled and highly mo-
bile. The client would like to know what measures it can 
put into place to safeguard product secrecy and reduce 
the risk that its key employees will defect to competitors 
prior to the completion of the project.  At the same time, 
it wants to ensure that it remains competitive in hiring.122 
2. A foreign-based company is in the process of opening a 
U.S. office.  It has a written parental leave policy used in 
its foreign offices that provides twelve weeks of paid leave 
to mothers of newborn children and six weeks paid leave 
plus six weeks unpaid leave to fathers of newborn chil-
dren.  The client would like to know whether it must alter 
any aspect of this policy to comply with U.S. law.123 
3. A company has just emerged from a protracted employ-
ment discrimination lawsuit.  While it ultimately won at 
trial, its litigation costs were significant.  The company’s 
human resources director has heard about the cost-saving 
benefits of arbitration and is considering adopting a 
company-wide policy requiring employees to agree to 
submit all disputes to arbitration.  The client would like 
to know whether such a policy would be in its best inter-
est and, if so, what the terms of its arbitration policy 
ought to be.124 
As these examples suggest, transactional questions are not spe-
cific to any one area of employment law doctrine.  They will surely 
arise with respect to matters that are fundamentally contractual.  In 
the first scenario, for instance, the resources on which the lawyer will 
most likely draw will be restrictive covenants, fixed term contracts, or 
some combination of these legal tools.  But transactional problems 
can also arise with respect to public law mandates, such as federal an-
tidiscrimination law and minimum labor standards.  As the second 
and third scenarios illustrate, these are areas in which corporate cli-
ents are likely to have questions regarding compliance and planning, 
 122 See Comprehensive Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. Software Artisans, Inc., 3 F.3d 730, 733–
34 (4th Cir. 1993). 
 123 See TIMOTHY P. GLYNN, RACHEL S. ARNOW-RICHMAN & CHARLES A. SULLIVAN, 
EMPLOYMENT LAW: PRIVATE ORDERING AND ITS LIMITATIONS 686 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 
2007) (problem 10.3). 
 124 Id. at 928 (problem 13.7). 
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and, in the last example, may use contract (in the form of an arbitra-
tion agreement) to implement their choices. 
When examining these examples, it also becomes apparent why 
transactional questions require more than just the ability to under-
stand legal rules and draft legal instruments.  Consistent with the 
teachings of preventive law theory, these scenarios require the lawyer 
to consider the client’s business interests in determining its best legal 
course of action.  In the first and third scenarios, the client is explicit 
about those interests.  Even if noncompetition law would enable the 
employer in the first scenario to require a broad restraint against 
post-employment competition, the employer will want to temper its 
contract somewhat to ensure that it does not lose strong job candi-
dates with multiple employment opportunities who are put off by 
such terms.125  In the third scenario, the client wants the attorney not 
simply to produce a viable arbitration agreement, but to opine on 
whether it would be worthwhile to implement an arbitration policy at 
all. 
In some situations, however, the client’s goals are less clear and 
may implicate ethical questions about the lawyer’s role.  The em-
ployer in the second scenario merely asks whether its paid leave pol-
icy must be altered to comply with U.S. law.  In fact, the United States 
does not require the employer to provide any paid leave at all, al-
though it does require that any voluntarily provided benefit program 
treat men and women equally absent a medical reason for the devia-
tion.126  The attorney in this situation will have to explain this to the 
client and determine whether the employer wants to provide paid 
 125 On the influence of relational incentives on employers’ choice to require a 
noncompete agreement, see Arnow-Richman, Rise of Delayed Term, supra note 15, at 
662 n.115. 
 126 The federal Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) requires employers of fifty em-
ployees or more to provide qualifying employees of either gender with a maximum 
of twelve weeks of unpaid, job-protected leave for a discrete set of qualifying caregiv-
ing-related events.  29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (2000); 29 C.F.R. § 825.112(a).  This 
leaves the employer free to provide additional benefits on a voluntary basis, such as 
paid leave, provided it does not run afoul of basic gender-discrimination prohibi-
tions, which would make unlawful any policy that benefits women more than men.  
The exception is a situation in which the employer provides additional benefits to 
women on the basis of pregnancy or related medical conditions.  This is because the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006), requires gender-
neutral treatment only insofar as a pregnant woman is similarly situated to male 
comparators in her ability to perform the requirements of the job.  See generally John-
son v. Univ. of Iowa, 431 F.3d 325, 328–29 (8th Cir. 2005) (explaining the distinction 
between parental leave benefits that must be gender neutral and lawful disability 
leave favoring biological mothers under PDA). 
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leave absent a legal obligation to do so before adjusting the policy to 
comply with antidiscrimination law. 
These types of transactional planning questions need not arise 
exclusively in management-oriented practices.  High level workers, 
and workers at any level who have sought-after skill sets, may be in a 
position to request particular terms of employment or to negotiate 
out of an employer’s standard requirements.  Workers in weaker bar-
gaining positions, who have little to no ability to demand unique 
terms of employment, can expect to be confronted with their em-
ployer’s form agreements and other unilaterally drafted documents 
on which they may need the advice of counsel.  Finally, incumbent 
employees at all levels may encounter personal circumstances—the 
need for leave, a medical accommodation, or similar event—that will 
lead them to a lawyer to learn more about their legal rights. 
The following scenarios are typical of transactional problems 
that an employee-side lawyer might encounter: 
4. A recent veterinary school graduate has been offered a 
position with an established veterinarian in a small town.  
The established doctor has asked her to sign a contract 
that prohibits her from practicing animal medicine with-
in the county limits for two years after terminating her re-
lationship with the practice.  She would like to know 
whether such an agreement is enforceable, and if so, 
whether she can refuse to sign it.127 
5. A truck driver was recently injured in an automobile ac-
cident in which he sustained serious back injuries that 
will permanently limit his ability to lift and carry.  He has 
been on medical leave for some time and is now free to 
return to work as a driver, but he will not be able to do 
the loading and unloading work that his employer typi-
cally requires.  He wants to know what his rights are.128 
As with the management-side examples, these scenarios demand 
more than just an assessment of the law.  Irrespective of the enforce-
ability of the noncompete presented in the fourth scenario, the client 
is best off avoiding the hassle of having to litigate that question when 
and if she leaves the established veterinarian’s practice.  It is there-
fore in her interest to avoid signing the noncompete now.129  Weigh-
ing against her refusal are the relational risks of raising objections to 
 127 See Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 536–37 (Wyo. 1993). 
 128 Cf. GLYNN, ARNOW-RICHMAN & SULLIVAN, supra note 123, at 646 (problem 10.1). 
 129 See generally Arnow-Richman, Worker Mobility, supra note 15, at 980–84 (describ-
ing the in terrorem effects and practical difficulties that noncompetes create for de-
parting employees irrespective of whether the restraint proves enforceable in court). 
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the employer’s form.  In the fifth scenario, the employee’s legal 
rights are questionable.  Prior to the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 
his back injury most likely would not have qualified as a disability;130 
and even subsequent to that Act, accommodating his condition may 
be unreasonable or pose an undue hardship to the employer.131  
However, those legal issues may not matter.  He is free to request an 
accommodation, and if it is framed effectively—with reference to the 
law, but with sensitivity to the employer’s needs—it may well be 
granted.132 
In sum, transactional questions are pervasive in all types of em-
ployment practice. The management attorney can expect to review 
policies, draft contracts, and consult about particular personnel deci-
sions and general human resources strategies, while the employee-
side attorney should anticipate being called upon to evaluate the risks 
and benefits associated with employer-drafted documents and help 
workers assert rights and preferences in the face of employer policies 
and practices.  In all cases, this will require skills well beyond cogni-
tive knowledge of legal rules and the ability to apply them to the facts 
of a particular dispute.  It will require the lawyer to appreciate a 
range of human and business interests, to identify relational and legal 
risks, and to forge and execute an appropriate course of action—in 
short, the full complement of preventive law skills.133  It is time to 
make that skill set a priority in preparing students to practice em-
ployment law. 
 130 See, e.g., Hancock v. Potter, 531 F.3d 474, 479 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that a 
work-related back injury that hindered the employee’s ability to perform her job was 
not a disability under the 1990 Act because there was no evidence that the injury af-
fected the employee’s major life activities); Sarmento v. Henry Schein, Inc., 262 Fed. 
App’x. 26, 27 (9th Cir. 2007) (lifting restrictions resulting from a back injury did not 
constitute a disability under the 1990 Act because an inability to perform a particular 
job is not a substantial limitation).  For an explaination of the changes wrought by 
the 2008 Act, see supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
 131 See, e.g., Peters v. City of Mauston, 311 F.3d 835, 845 (7th Cir. 2002) (em-
ployee’s request to have someone else perform the heaviest lifting was unreasonable 
because some heavy lifting was an essential function of the city job of operator of 
construction equipment); Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1260 (11th 
Cir. 2001) (employer was not required to alter the position of material handler for 
an employee with a back injury because lifting items weighing up to fifty pounds was 
an essential function of the job). 
 132 For a discussion of the reasons why employers may be inclined to grant ac-
commodations not mandated by law, see Hoffman, supra note 118, at 335–37; Schartz 
et al., supra note 118, at 941–43; Travis, supra note 17, at 44–55; supra Part III.B.2. 
 133 See supra Part II.C. 
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2. Resisting Claims of Right and Left 
The next Part of this Article tackles the specifics of how to in-
corporate transactional training into the basic employment law 
course.  Before turning to implementation, however, it is important 
to address the ideological significance of adding a transactional com-
ponent to the course.  Many of the jurisprudential developments de-
scribed in the previous Part are decidedly anti-plaintiff in effect, if not 
in intent.  Even so, teaching transactionally should not be equated 
with presenting a management-sided course or even a purely transac-
tional one. 
To begin, the pedagogical approach espoused here is intended 
to supplement rather than displace other teaching methods and 
course themes.  Advocacy skills remain important for all members of 
the employment bar, including those representing corporate clients.  
While corporate and commercial law practices tend to sharply divide 
the “litigators” from the “deal makers,” management-side employ-
ment lawyers both make their beds and lie in them.  That is, these 
lawyers both draft contracts and policies and litigate their effect and 
enforceability down the road.  Pedagogical reform that comes at the 
expense of traditional training would be a disservice to aspiring man-
agement lawyers, as well as to the future members of the plaintiff’s 
bar. 
Neither must transactional training necessarily focus on man-
agement-side work.  As the previous Part indicates, opportunities to 
apply transactional skills and thinking will present in employee-side 
practice as well, albeit with less frequency.134  Such skills are also ap-
plicable in other dynamics that attorneys for employees will regularly 
encounter.  Negotiation and settlement of disputes, while heavily de-
pendent on advocacy skills, also require the creative problem solving 
ability that transactional training cultivates.135  The lawyer who under-
stands how to avoid problems ex ante will likely do better at resolving 
them post hoc.136  Finally would-be plaintiff’s attorneys will benefit 
from better understanding the perspective of the opposing party.  
The goal of transactional teaching is to present lawyering in an active 
posture that more closely approximates real-life practice.  Employee-
side lawyers will fare better if they understand the business and rela-
 134 See supra Part III.C.1. 
 135 See Re, supra note 61, at 694–97 (describing relationship between preventive 
law practice and the skills required for conciliation and settlement). 
 136 See id. 
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tional motivations that underlie employers’ policies, practices, and 
legal strategies. 
More importantly, management-side transactional practice need 
not be taught from the perspective of liability avoidance.  Reducing 
the costs associated with employment is certainly a motive and effect 
of proactive defense practice; but compliance is an equally important 
goal.  To the extent management lawyers emphasize compliance in 
their practice, their transactional planning activities need not be at 
odds with plaintiffs’ interests.  If an employer, through advice of 
counsel, familiarizes itself with the law and acts in accordance with its 
legal obligations, the employee is better off than if the employer 
shirks responsibility, forcing that individual to pursue her rights 
through judicial or other legal channels.137  Of course, the approach 
is also less costly to the employer.  In short, where compliance (rather 
than avoidance) is the primary defense strategy, everyone is advan-
taged. 
There is even reason to believe that in some cases transactional 
defense practice will result in outcomes better than what workers 
would obtain through the adversarial process.  As previously noted, 
research on ADA accommodation requests suggests that employers 
not infrequently grant accommodations to workers who do not qual-
ify for statutory protection.138  Data suggest that they both accommo-
date workers who do not meet what, until recently, was a strict statu-
tory definition of disability, and they provide accommodations that at 
times exceed what the law requires of them.139  Preventive law theory 
offers insight on this phenomenon.  Given the complexity of clients’ 
interests and human motivation, it is seldom advisable or possible to 
eliminate risk completely or pursue a strategy that reaches to the lim-
its of the law.140  Thus, in the fifth scenario, involving the injured 
 137 There is extensive literature on the superiority of non-litigation channels for 
achieving better outcomes for disputants, which is beyond the scope of this Article.  
It should be noted, however, that scholars of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) 
have long emphasized the potential for “win-win” outcomes through cooperative, 
problem solving approaches to party disputes that aim to identify shared interests.  
See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Access to Justice: The Social Responsibility of Lawyers, 10 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 37, 42–43 (2002) (noting that ADR outcomes are “qualitatively 
better” when parties take a cooperative approach rather than an adversarial ap-
proach to resolving legal disputes); see also Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, 
Business Lawyering and Value Creation for Clients, 74 OR. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (1995) (de-
scribing ways in which lawyers, through negotiation, structure solutions that maxi-
mize value and benefit all parties).   
 138 See supra Part III.B.2. 
 139 See Hoffman, supra note 118, at 333, 338; supra Part III.B.2. 
 140 See DAUER, supra note 65, at 19. 
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truck driver, a compliance-oriented management lawyer might agree 
to an accommodation irrespective of whether the driver has a statu-
tory disability, either through an abundance of caution or to advance 
other managerial interests (such as the desire to maintain a good 
worker or avoid a gap in coverage).141  In short, transactional training 
is not about teaching students how to skirt legal obligations or avoid 
liability.  Rather it is an opportunity to inculcate those who will be 
representing management with a compliance ethic.  By incorporating 
a transactional perspective in the classroom we can prepare students 
not simply to do right by their client but to run a management-side 
practice responsibly. 
IV. IMPLEMENTING THE TRANSACTIONAL APPROACH: THE LAW OF 
EMPLOYEE HANDBOOKS AS AN EXERCISE IN TRANSACTIONAL PRACTICE 
The previous Part explained why the employment law course is a 
valuable platform for training transactionally minded lawyers as well 
as why the contemporary employment practitioner must acquire 
transactional skills.  This Part turns to the mechanics of leveraging 
those synergies in the classroom. 
Transactional teaching can be achieved through a variety of 
techniques and using any number of materials.  In its simplest form, 
it consists of supplementing doctrinal discussion rooted in case law 
and rule application with forward-thinking questions that push stu-
dents to implement law proactively.  The book that I use in the basic 
three-credit employment law course, Employment Law: Private Ordering 
and Its Limitations, by Timothy Glynn, Charles Sullivan, and myself, 
provides the advantage of incorporating these types of questions and 
problems in the text itself among the primary materials and authors’ 
notes.142  Of course, once an instructor becomes accustomed to iden-
tifying transactional teaching moments, it is easy to supplement any 
set of materials with these types of questions and problems. 
Ideally, however, transactional teaching should go beyond class-
room discussion.  Providing a rich forum for developing skills in this 
area often requires an extended experience in which students can 
put their ideas and advice to the test in a realistic context.  This Part 
describes an exercise I have developed and incorporated into the ba-
sic three-credit employment law course that requires students to re-
vise an employer’s personnel manual in light of case law suggesting 
 141 See Travis, supra note 17, at 44–55 (describing advantages to employer of strong 
accommodation ethic). 
 142 GLYNN, ARNOW-RICHMAN & SULLIVAN, supra note 123. 
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that such documents can have contractual significance.  The assign-
ment is administered upon completion of the case materials on em-
ployee handbooks, thus providing a simulated practice experience in 
which students engage in problem-solving, drafting, and anticipating 
client needs in response to existing law. 
This Part begins with a brief primer on the state of the law on 
employee handbooks, drawing on the three principal cases that stu-
dents in my course read prior to participating in the employee hand-
book revision exercise.  It then describes the goals and parameters of 
the exercise and provides instruction on how to administer it.  Fi-
nally, this Part deconstructs the exercise, offering insights on its 
pedagogical value. 
A. Handbook Basics 
Employee handbook law offers an accessible and highly realistic 
context for constructing an exercise in transactional practice.  It is 
well-settled in almost all jurisdictions that promises contained in an 
employer-drafted personnel manual can be contractually binding.143  
The key case, presented in most employment law casebooks as well as 
many contracts casebooks, is the New Jersey Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Woolley v. Hoffmann La Roche. 144  This case serves as the princi-
pal source for teaching the basic doctrine in my textbook, as well as 
the factual scenario on which the handbook revision exercise is 
based. 
In Woolley, an engineer with nearly nine years on the job was 
fired after writing a report on a piping problem in his employer’s 
building.145  Upon hire, the plaintiff had received a company person-
nel manual that stated: “It is the policy of Hoffmann-La Roche to re-
tain to the extent consistent with company requirements, the services 
of all employees who perform their duties efficiently and effec-
tively.”146  The manual also listed and defined six types of termination: 
“‘layoff,’ ‘discharge due to performance,’ ‘discharge, disciplinary,’ 
‘retirement’ and ‘resignation.’”147  It made no mention of the possi-
bility of termination without cause.148
 143 An important exception occurs under Montana law, where such claims are 
preempted by the Montana Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act.  Wrongful 
Discharge from Employment Act of 1987, MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-913 (2007). 
 144 Woolley v. Hoffmann La Roche, 491 A.2d 1257 (N.J. 1985). 
 145 Id. at 1258. 
 146 Id. at 1259 n.2. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. 
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Woolley sued for breach of contract, alleging the company had 
violated the termination policy in the manual by firing him without 
cause.149  The court agreed that the contents of the manual, including 
the categories and procedures for termination, could contractually 
bind the employer.150  Emphasizing the language of the manual and 
the context in which it was disseminated, the court stated that the 
document comprised the most definitive statement of the company’s 
policies and that an employee would likely view it as binding.151  The 
court held that under these circumstances the manual should be 
“construe[d] . . . in accordance with the reasonable expectations of 
the employees.” 152 
In so holding, however, the court created a significant loophole.  
Addressing anticipated objections by employers, including the fear 
that the decision would open the floodgates to employee handbook 
claims, the court offered employers a blueprint for avoiding liability.  
It stated that employers wishing to preserve the nonbinding status of 
its policies are free to do so by inserting disclaiming language in their 
personnel materials.  The court explained: 
All that need be done is the inclusion in a very prominent posi-
tion of an appropriate statement that there is no promise of any 
kind by the employer contained in the manual; that regardless of 
what the manual says or provides, the employer promises nothing 
and remains free to change wages and all other working condi-
tions without having to consult anyone and without anyone’s 
agreement; and that the employer continues to have the absolute 
power to fire anyone with or without good cause.153 
This language exposes students to the key contractual tool they 
will employ in revising the manual on behalf of Hoffmann-La Roche.  
If an employer does not want to be bound by its handbook, the Wool-
ley court explains, it must say so explicitly.  Since that decision, a large 
body of case law has developed on the viability of disclaimer language 
in employee handbooks, much of which gives significant deference to 
employers that include such language.  However, at least some courts 
have shown a willingness to permit employee contract claims where 
the employer’s disclaimer is confusing or perceived as contradictory 
to other parts of the handbook.  In Conner v. City of Forest Acres, the 
South Carolina Supreme Court denied summary judgment to an em-
 149 Id. at 1258. 
 150 Wooley, 491 A.2d at 1264. 
 151 Id. at 1265. 
 152 Id. at 1264. 
 153 Id. at 1271. 
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ployer on an employee’s breach of contract claim despite the fact 
that the handbook on which it was based contained numerous dis-
claimers and reiterations of employees’ at-will status.154  Conner was a 
police dispatcher for the city of Forest Acres from 1984 until her ter-
mination in 1993.155  The city’s personnel manual, on which Conner 
based her breach of contract claim, contained extensive provisions 
regarding the bases and mechanism for discharge and discipline. 156  
Among other things, the manual contained a nonexclusive list of acts 
considered to be violations of the city’s code of conduct, all of which 
were for-cause bases for discipline or termination.157  It also laid out a 
three-step progressive discipline policy.158  However, the manual dis-
claimed any obligation to follow this progression and stated in several 
places that its policies were noncontractual and subject to change.159 
The court found a jury question on whether the handbook cre-
ated a contractual right to termination only for cause pursuant to the 
procedures outlined therein.160  The court explained that the hand-
book contained numerous statements that were entirely at odds with 
its various disclaimers.161  For instance, the manual used mandatory 
language when describing the disciplinary process, asserting that 
“discipline shall be of an increasingly progressive nature.”162  Such 
language was enough to create a factual question as to whether a rea-
sonable employee would understand the manual to be contractual.163  
Thus, Conner presents a second point of law that students must assimi-
late in conducting the revision exercise: not only must the handbook 
include an appropriate disclaimer, it must avoid conflicting promis-
sory language. 
The final frontier in the law of employee handbook, and the 
area in which significant legal uncertainty persists, concerns hand-
book modification.  Assuming the handbook has the force of con-
tract, how do employers go about changing its terms?  Jurisdictions 
 154 Conner v. City of Forest Acres, 560 S.E.2d 606, 612 (S.C. 2002). 
 155 Id. at 607. 
 156 Id. at 608–09. 
 157 Id. at 608. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Conner, 560 S.E.2d at 611. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. at 611 n.4. 
 163 Cf. Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1264 (N.J. 1985) 
(When an employer distributes a manual providing certain employee benefits, a 
court “should construe them in accordance with the reasonable expectations of the 
employees.”). 
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that have wrestled with the question are divided.  Some hold that the 
employer may modify its handbook unilaterally and others require 
something akin to a formal contract modification.164  DeMasse v. ITT 
Corp., a case on certified question to the Arizona Supreme Court, of-
fers students a glimpse of both camps.165  In 1989, well after the plain-
tiff-employees had been hired, the defendant-employer modified its 
personnel manual to include an “at-will” provision and a clause per-
mitting unilateral modification.166  Subsequently, in 1993, the em-
ployer announced that future layoffs, previously based on seniority, 
would now be dependent on performance. 167  The plaintiffs were laid 
off under the new policy and brought breach of contract claims 
against the company based on the original handbook. 168  The precise 
question certified to the court was whether the employer could uni-
laterally alter the layoff procedure, assuming the manual was contrac-
tual to begin with.169 
The majority held that it could not.170  Adopting what is arguably 
emerging as the minority rule, the court held that once an employer 
contracts to provide a form of job security, an implied-in-fact agree-
ment exists which can be modified only with consideration from the 
employer and explicit assent by the employee.171  The majority re-
jected the idea that the employee’s decision to remain employed or 
the employer’s decision to retain the employee could supply the req-
uisite contract formalities, insisting on “[s]eparate consideration, be-
yond continued employment.”172  It further held that in order for the 
employer to secure employee acceptance, the “employee must be in-
formed of any new term, aware of its impact on the pre-existing con-
 164 Compare Asmus v. Pac. Bell, 999 P.2d 71, 78 (Cal. 2000) (holding that contract 
rights which were unilaterally granted may also be unilaterally reduced or termi-
nated), and Ryan v. Dan’s Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 401 (Utah 1998) (holding 
that continuing employment by an employee after a unilateral contract offer consti-
tutes the necessary consideration for an acceptance when the employee had been 
notified of the change), with Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., 662 
A.2d 89, 99 (Conn. 1995) (holding that continued work by an employee does not 
comprise an acceptance of a modified handbook manual that “substantially inter-
feres with an employee’s legitimate expectations about the terms of employment”). 
 165 DeMasse v. ITT Corp., 984 P.2d 1138, 1140 (Ariz. 1999). 
 166 Id. at 1141. 
 167 Id. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. at 1142. 
 170 Id. at 1144. 
 171 DeMasse, 984 P.2d at 1144. 
 172 Id. at 1145. 
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tract, and affirmatively consent to it to accept the offered modifica-
tion.”173 
A strong dissent took issue with the notion that the employment 
relationship had ever lost its at-will character as a result of the com-
pany’s layoff policy and argued that continued retention of the work-
ers alone provided sufficient consideration for any new terms.174  In-
sisting that employers must retain discretion to alter terms of 
employment when economic necessity dictates, it concluded: “A sin-
gle contract term in a policy manual may, while it exists, become an 
enforceable condition of employment . . . [and] the party unilaterally 
responsible for inserting it into the manual may, on reasonable no-
tice, exercise an equal right to remove it.”175 
B. Goals and Logistics 
The basic instructions for the exercise are presented as a prob-
lem in the casebook: 
Imagine that, following Woolley, the Human Resources di-
rector at Hoffmann-LaRoche contacts you about revising 
the company’s personnel manual.  The HR director feels 
that the manual is good for employee morale and would 
like to continue using it, but hopes to alter the language so 
as to protect the company from future contractual liability.  
Look at footnote 2 of Woolley, which contains the key lan-
guage that gave rise to Woolley’s claim.  How would you re-
draft this?  What might you add?  Will the revision you cre-
ate satisfy the company’s goals?176 
I supplement this with an assignment memo that describes the exer-
cise requirements, as well as a digital copy of the handbook text taken 
directly from the case.  Because the court quotes only a small amount 
of the most relevant language, tying the exercise to the case provides 
a natural and necessary limit on the scope of assignment.177 
 173 Id. at 1146. 
 174 Id. at 1153–55 (Jones, J., dissenting in part). 
 175 Id. at 1153. 
 176 GLYNN, ARNOW-RICHMAN & SULLIVAN, supra note 123, at 115. 
 177 I am forever dismayed by the fact that the critical language from which the 
court derives a contractual promise to job security is contained in lowly footnote to 
the opinion.  Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1259 n.2 (N.J. 
1985).  However, it offers the opportunity to point out how important it is to read 
cases at this level of detail, as well as to demonstrate how little legal rules mean in the 
absence of specific facts.  See generally David Simon Sokolow, From Kurosawa to (Dun-
can) Kennedy: The Lessons of Rashomon for Current Legal Education, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 
969, 969–70 (1991) (critiquing the legal academy’s emphasis on legal rules and its 
failure to teach students how to find and analyze facts). 
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I impose strict limits on the resources students can consult.  Stu-
dents may use only the three principle cases in the textbook—Woolley, 
Connor, and DeMasse—and the accompanying note material.178  Out-
side research (legal or otherwise) is prohibited.  This is in part to en-
sure that students do not turn in a ready-made, internet-accessible 
form of questionable quality in fulfillment of the assignment.179  It is 
also to preempt the inevitable wrongheaded plunge into additional 
case law.  Having completed one or more years of law school courses 
taught predominantly in the advocacy tradition, students are primed 
to turn to Westlaw or LexisNexis to suss out the “key case” that will 
magically answer whatever legal question they face.  That is generally 
not the way to approach a transactional problem.  Indeed the notion 
of a case “on point” is inapposite here; students have yet to draft the 
language that would form the factual basis for an analogy to deci-
sional law.180  Contrary to prior skills experiences, the “answer” here 
will not come from more cases but from thinking creatively and stra-
tegically about what they already know. 
The goal of the revision is explicit.  Both the casebook instruc-
tions and the supplemental assignment memo emphasize that stu-
dents are to revise the manual in light of the client’s competing in-
terests.181  These include avoiding future liability and maintaining the 
utility of the manual as a management tool.  The former interest 
flows directly from the case law: the employer wants to prevent a re-
peat of the result in Woolley.  It would like the freedom to alter or de-
viate from the provisions in its handbook without placing itself at risk 
of a breach of contract suit.  The latter interest has nothing to do 
with the case law and is in fact at odds with the employer’s desire to 
reduce legal risk.  The content of the handbook, particularly those 
 178 See GLYNN, ARNOW-RICHMAN & SULLIVAN, supra note 123 at 102–22. 
 179 There is a wide literature on the value and efficiency of form contracts, which 
is beyond the scope of this Article.  See generally Symposium, “Boilerplate”: Founda-
tions of Market Contracts, 104 MICH. L. REV. 821 (2006).  It is worth noting, however, 
that recent scholarship has called into question the effectiveness of standard con-
tracts used even in heavily negotiated and highly lawyered contexts.  See, e.g., Steven 
M. Davidoff, The Structure of Private Equity, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) 
(manuscript at 42–43), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1148178 (describing 
how relational and institutional impediments to modifying the structure of private 
equity acquisitions resulted in the collapse of multiple transactions amid the eco-
nomic downturn of 2007). 
 180 It is for this reason that this Article refers to the skill of transactional lawyering 
as “creating facts from law.”  See infra Part IV.C.1; cf. Brest, supra note 39, at 7 
(“[L]awyers in everyday practice are called upon to help clients arrange their future 
affairs in dynamically changing situations where the facts, as well as the law, are any-
thing but determinate.”) 
 181 GLYNN, ARNOW-RICHMAN & SULLIVAN, supra note 123, at 115. 
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provisions that relate to job security, help create a positive work envi-
ronment.  The court in Woolley describes the company’s handbook as 
an “attractive inducement” to employees that has helped it to achieve 
a reputation as an employer of choice.182  The literature of business 
management has linked workplace morale to business outcomes, and 
thus the positive impressions the manual creates may translate into a 
productivity advantages for the employer.183  A widely disseminated 
manual can also ensure some amount of consistency in the admini-
stration of personnel matters.184  In this way it serves top manage-
ment’s interests in maintaining a degree of centralized control across 
a large organization. 
Students are less accustomed to identifying client business inter-
ests, as distinct from their legal problems, and I therefore allocate 
class time to teasing them out in advance of the exercise.  Woolley al-
ludes to a subset of these concepts in what might be thought of as the 
 182 See Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1266 (N.J. 1985).  Put-
ting it in less benign terms, the employer may have intentionally hoped that adop-
tion of an employee-friendly manual would help forestall unionization of its workers.  
See id. at 1264. 
 183 See FREDERICK F. REICHHELD, THE LOYALTY EFFECT: THE HIDDEN FORCE BEHIND 
GROWTH, PROFITS, AND LASTING VALUE 19–21 (1996) (advocating a loyalty-based man-
agement approach focusing on retention of customers, employees and investors as 
key to long-term value creation); Stacey Wagner, Retention: Finders, Keepers, TRAINING 
& DEV., Aug. 2000, at 64 (noting that positive working relationships and personal in-
vestments between employers and employees are known to improve productivity and 
profit margins).  On the subject of handbooks in particular, see, for example, Rachel 
Leiser Levy, Comment, Judicial Interpretation of Employee Handbooks: The Creation of a 
Common Law Information-Eliciting Penalty Default Rule, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 695, 721 
(2005) (noting the “[c]onventional corporate wisdom” that employee handbooks 
produce a “sense of shared knowledge [that] boosts workplace morale and work-
place productivity by giving employees confidence that employers uniformly apply 
company policies”); Anne Ciesla Bancroft, Give that Handbook a Hand: Employee Hand-
books Deserve both Applause and Attention—Keep Them Up to Date, BUS. L. TODAY, Mar.–
Apr. 2005, at 27 (2005) (suggesting that employee handbooks can raise employee 
morale and help prevent unionization by highlighting favorable employee benefits 
and presenting a positive company image);  Mike Johnson, Good Policies Lead to a Bias-
Free Workplace, TRIBUNE BUS. WKLY., Jan. 20, 2003, at 1 (discussing the causal link be-
tween standard policies appearing in an employee handbook and lower discrimina-
tion in the workplace and, therefore, higher employee productivity and morale). 
 184 See Joseph W. R. Lawson II, Give Your Employees a Hand (Book), 6 LEGAL MGMT. 
24, 28–29 (1999) (employee handbooks promote consistency in handling human re-
source issues, communicate vital information to employees, save time for manage-
ment, and help the firm comply with federal and state law); Maureen E. McClain, 
Handling Wrongful Termination Claims 2001; What Plaintiffs and Defendants Have to 
Know, 650 PRAC. L. INST./LIT. 111, 114 (2001) (employee handbooks promote consis-
tent administration of policy which increases employee morale and manager confi-
dence in applying company policy). 
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“policy” portions of the decision.185  To carry discussion beyond the 
text, I simply ask students, “Why do you think the employer adopted 
this manual in the first place?”  The answer is as critical as the legal 
rule in going forward into the exercise, but one entirely foreign to 
students who are accustomed to looking at the consequences of par-
ties’ actions rather than the rationale for taking them.  Were it not 
for the benefits the employer receives from the manual, it would 
make no sense to have one at all in light of the risk of contractual li-
ability.  Balancing that risk against the client’s goals is ultimately the 
exercise’s core. 
The final product for the assignment consists of two documents: 
a revised draft of the handbook and a cover memo to the client de-
tailing the proposed changes and the rationale behind them.  Stu-
dents complete the drafting work outside of class.  Thus, only the 
presentation of the exercise and the post-completion debriefing 
compete with doctrinal material for instructional time.186  In terms of 
assessment, I have administered the exercise both on a graded and 
pass/fail basis.187  When administering the exercise for a grade, I use 
a rubric that evaluates the scope and effectiveness of the revisions 
themselves as well as the quality and sophistication of the client 
memo.188  All students in the group get the same grade, which I count 
 185 This offers yet another illustration of the differences between advocacy and 
transactional thinking.  Students have come to think of policy considerations as the 
gravy on a meaty argument, but “policy” discussion in cases ultimately reflects con-
cerns about how particular rules will affect different constituencies.  Such judicial 
discussions therefore offer a valuable data source for mining and understanding cli-
ent interests and concerns.  Cf. Dauer, supra note 7, at 493 (stating that the differ-
ence between “policy” issues and client issues is that “policy is not about clients one-
at-a-time; it is about social groups a million or two at a time”). 
 186 This Article addresses the issue of time management and the competing de-
mands on the basic course in greater detail infra Part V.A. 
 187 Both methods have advantages, but ultimately, grading is the better course, 
albeit more time consuming for the professor.  See infra Part V.A. 
 188 The issue of assessment in legal education is a broad topic beyond the scope of 
this Article.  See generally THE CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 162–84.  Briefly, my 
process for assessing the handbook revisions consists of examining whether students 
have addressed the four key areas where editing or additional language is required:  I 
look to see if they have modified (1) the title and purpose of the handbook, (2) the 
bases for termination, and (3) the disciplinary procedures policy, and I look for (4) 
the addition of a disclaimer that meets the criteria as set out in Woolley.  I assign be-
tween zero and five points on each of these components of the revisions, bearing in 
mind such things as the clarity of the language used and the degree to which the 
language actually accomplishes one or more of the client goals.  In assessing the cli-
ent memo, I similarly assign points, albeit based on a more intangible set of criteria.  
These include the writing mechanics and style, the thoroughness of the content, the 
accuracy and appropriateness of any references to law, and the degree to which the 
memo demonstrates an awareness of its audience and the competing concerns of the 
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as approximately fifteen percent of the final grade for the course.  I 
require students to complete an exercise assessment form for my own 
edification as well as a teammate assessment form, which I hope 
serves as a modest deterrent to would-be shirkers. 
C. Lessons Learned 
What does this exercise accomplish?  Exposure to drafting—the 
“skills” lesson—is only one piece of the students’ pedagogical experi-
ence.  In addition to this simulated “practice” component, the as-
signment re-teaches the analytical lessons learned in the first year of 
law school and reinforced through much of the curriculum, albeit 
with a transactional perspective. 
1. Creating Facts from Law 
A key aspect of the assignment is learning how to apply the law 
in practice in a way that differs from the type of rule application in 
which students engage when responding to exam questions and class-
room hypotheticals.  By the second year, students are adept at analyz-
ing how the law will apply to a set of facts and formulating arguments 
for and against a particular outcome.189  However, as legal education 
critics have pointed out, facts do not arrive in ready-made packages; 
they must be ferreted out by the lawyer.190 
client.  For other examples of other faculty’s methods for evaluating written and 
skills oriented exercises, see, for example, Daniel L. Barnett, Triage in the Trenches of 
the Legal Writing Course: The Theory and Methodology of Analytical Critique, 38 U. TOL. L. 
REV. 651, 659–74 (2007) (proposing techniques for effective feedback on student 
drafted assignments that emphasize tailored and appropriately detailed commentary 
drawing on class discussion and prioritizing defects in legal analysis); Michael J. 
Madison, Writing to Learn Law and Writing in Law: An Intellectual Property Illustration, 52 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 823, 834–35 (2008) (explaining use of a ten-point scale to assess 
composition and substantive elements of student memos in an intellectual property 
course); Sophie M. Sparrow, Describing the Ball: Improve Teaching by Using Rubrics—
Explicit Grading Criteria, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 32–37 (2004) (explaining a method 
of developing grading rubrics with specific criteria and point values and advantages 
of using same for assessing exam performance). 
 189 See Brest, supra note 39, at 7 (1995) (“The case method teaches problem solv-
ing by asking . . . [g]iven this set of facts and these precedents, what are the rights 
and liabilities of the parties?”); Stark, supra note 37, at 224 (“[W]e teach students to 
take the law and apply it to the facts to create a persuasive argument. . . .  The para-
digm is one in which the litigators seek a certain legal result by working backwards 
from the law to a static set of facts.”). 
 190 See Brest, supra note 39, at 7 (“[T]he case method of instruction is limited by 
the inexorable fact that appellate cases embody static situations with determinate 
facts.”); Dauer, supra note 7, at 486 (describing preventive law practice as “[c]reating 
institutions and arrangements on a clean napkin” as opposed to litigation “in which 
the boundaries of a problem are to a considerable degree preset”). 
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The lawyer in such critiques is implicitly a litigator.191  True, the 
facts do not lay themselves out on a conference table, neatly arranged 
to trigger particular legal questions, but for the litigator they exist to 
be “discovered.”  This is not to diminish the indeterminate nature of 
what the litigator will find.  He or she will have to parse through dif-
ferent versions of events, contend with foggy or selective recollec-
tions, weigh the possibility of bias, and perhaps form a moral judg-
ment in shaping the facts into a particular narrative.192  But the 
relevant events have happened. 
In contrast, the transactional lawyer deals in a world in which 
there are no facts—yet.193  Whereas the litigator is part sleuth, part 
sculptor, the transactional lawyer is the inventor of the raw material.  
It is her job to create the facts using the rule of law as a baseline and a 
boundary.  In its baseline function, the law provides the basic tools 
that the lawyer will use to achieve desired results.  In the ordinary 
business contract scenario, such “tools” include representations and 
warranties, covenants, and conditions.194  By analogy, the relevant le-
gal tool in the handbook exercise is the disclaimer.  It is this drafting 
technique that allows the employer to create its desired protection 
against an adverse legal result.  But the role of law is not only func-
tional, it is also a constraint on interests.  The transactional lawyer 
structures the relationship and papers the deal to stay within the law, 
but with an eye toward maximizing client gain.  In the case of an em-
ployee handbook, that means offering the client the basic language it 
needs for protection, while at the same time sanctioning some degree 
of promissory language in order to achieve the client’s business goal 
of fostering a positive work environment.  Absent this, the “deal” is 
not valuable for the client.195 
 191 See e.g., Sokolow, supra note 177, at 970 (“During the negotiating process, dur-
ing settlement talks, or at trial, lawyers must first discover the facts before they can 
map out strategies or formulate defenses for their clients.”). 
 192 See id. at 975. 
 193 See Brest, supra note 39, at 7 (“By contrast [to what is taught through the case 
method], lawyers in everyday practice are called upon to help clients arrange their 
future affairs in dynamically changing situations where the facts, as well as the law, 
are anything but determinate.”). 
 194 Professor Tina Stark refers to these as “the contract’s building blocks.”  See 
Stark, supra note 37, at 225. 
 195 The seminal work on value creation through transactional lawyering is Ronald 
Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239 
(1984), which deals with the different but analogous context of a capital asset pricing 
in the context of a business to business transaction.  This Article explores the analogy 
further infra Part IV.C.4. 
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To students, the notion of creating facts from law is perspective 
shifting and empowering. The construct offers a counter framework 
for evaluating the facts they read in reported cases.  Facts are not 
simply crafted into a legal theory of a case at the point of dispute.  
Where sophisticated parties are concerned, the facts as often as not 
were designed by lawyers with the law in mind.  It is the creative task 
of forming relationships and attempting to engineer desired results 
that makes transactional law attractive to those who practice it.  The 
exercise allows students to experience some of the satisfaction of be-
ing in the role of an enabler rather than in the stop-loss posture of an 
advocate.196 
More importantly, engineering facts in the face of legal bounda-
ries reveals a more nuanced picture of the client’s interest.  Within 
the context of an adversarial proceeding, the client’s goal is to win 
(whether that means receiving a favorable judgment or reaching a sa-
tisfactory settlement), and the lawyer obliges by making the best legal 
arguments that the existing facts enable.  This often means lawyering 
from the extremes.  Thus, in the case of a breach of contract action 
based on an employee handbook, the lawyer for the employer will ar-
gue that the manual provided no basis for employee expectations, 
that the employer never made or intended any promise, and that 
even if it had, the employer has the unilateral right to alter its proce-
dures and policies. 
The difference is that in the planning posture, the lawyer is not 
just thinking about a legal outcome, but must also think about busi-
ness issues, which are often in tension with legal interests.  That is 
very much the case in the handbook situation where, as described 
previously, the interest in using the manual as a managerial tool is at 
odds with the employer’s desire to avoid liability.197  I reiterate to stu-
dents during the course of the exercise that their task is not to elimi-
nate the risk of contractual liability, which is impossible in any event, 
but to best serve the client’s interest.198  Achieving the most for the 
 196 The frequent colloquial characterization of transactional lawyers as “deal mak-
ers” and litigators as those who “clean up” after them, is a propos here.  Cf. Brest, su-
pra note 39, at 7 (“[I]f one looks back to the origin of many cases, the parties were 
not contestants at all.  Rather, they were individuals or entities seeking counsel in ar-
ranging their personal or business affairs or resolving a nascent dispute.  In some in-
stances, the very fact that litigation ensued signals a failure of their lawyers’ judgment 
or skill.”). 
 197 See supra Part IV.B. 
 198 Cf. Dauer, supra note 65, at 19 (A core principle of preventive law is that “the 
optimal management of legal risk is seldom achieved by driving one of its compo-
nents to zero.”). 
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client on both fronts means the lawyer will not be drafting a docu-
ment that falls well outside the bounds of contract, the kind of 
document that would make litigators’ work easy.  Rather the transac-
tional lawyer wants to play right along the boundary where it can re-
main safe from contractual liability but preserve the meaning of the 
document.199  The worst possible result is a handbook so full of dis-
claimers and ambivalent statements as to be utterly functionless.200  
The challenge is finding a comfortable place in the middle. 
2. It’s Different (Drafting) in Real Life 
Of course, saying and doing are a universe apart.  The drafting 
component of the assignment demonstrates to students how difficult 
it is to effectuate in writing what they envision in their heads.  This 
reality gap is one they have encountered in the context of framing le-
gal arguments: they have already experienced the difference between 
articulating an idea in class and actually developing it in a brief or on 
an exam, but most have not had a comparable experience in a trans-
actional context.  When they learn that the assignment does not re-
quire (and indeed prohibits) research, they expect it to be relatively 
simple.  They invariably report in debriefing the exercise that it 
 199 Framing the task in this way not only focuses and hones student drafting, it is 
likely to spur discussion about the lawyer’s role.  Students may be concerned that ef-
fectuating the client’s dual goals will result in a document that is misleading to work-
ers, or that this is perhaps the client’s intent.  Such a realization offers one of many 
opportunities to engage issues of professionalism and the rules of ethics in the con-
text of the exercise.  Students should realize that the rules of ethics do not prohibit 
this type of drafting.  The lawyer owes no duty to the client’s workforce, the hand-
book is not a court document, and there is no misrepresentation.  That conclusion, 
however, does not address the degree to which students may find the endeavor un-
settling, nor does it dictate that they go about their business disregarding the possi-
ble consequences of their work.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. 2 
(2004) (“It is proper for a lawyer to refer to relevant moral and ethical considera-
tions in giving advice . . . [such] considerations impinge upon most legal questions 
and may decisively influence how the law will be applied.”).  A full treatment of the 
ethical and professional issues that arise in the face of legally sanctioned but morally 
troubling conduct is beyond the scope of this Article.  However, on the particular 
question of misleading language in an employee handbook, it can be helpful to re-
mind students that the legal standard for determining the employer’s contractual 
liability is the “reasonable expectations” of the employees.  The document that truly 
misleads the worker will also fail the employer.  For a useful discussion of the gap be-
tween law and justice, as well as guidance for discussing such issues with clients, see 
generally Stephen L. Pepper, Lawyer’s Ethics in the Gap Between Law and Justice, 40 S. 
TEX. L. REV. 181 (1999). 
 200 Indeed, such a result is worse than no handbook at all in that it is likely to be 
confusing to the employee and, by virtue of its existence, still leave the employer at 
risk of suit. 
ARNOW-RICHMAN (FINAL) 4/6/2009  11:12:21 PM 
2009] EMPLOYMENT AS TRANSACTION 495 
 
proved significantly more difficult and time consuming than they ini-
tially expected.201 
Like any exercise in legal writing, part of the challenge, and 
hence the value, derives from legal complexity.  The process of rule 
application forces a much closer examination of the rules themselves 
than can be achieved in reading cases and articulating holdings.  This 
is why the hypothetical question is considered the signature pedagogy 
of law school.202  The process, depending on how the instructor for-
mulates the questions, can illuminate either the forest or the trees.  
Thus, a particular fact pattern may highlight the individual elements 
of a multi-part test or it may introduce issues governed by rules other 
than those in the case immediately at hand, forcing students to inte-
grate other sources of authority. 
The same set of benefits accrues in the transactional exercise.  It 
is easy enough to understand that a handbook must contain a dis-
claimer in order to avoid contractual obligation.  But what exactly 
should the disclaimer say?  Examining the language in Woolley with an 
eye toward drafting reveals that, to be effective, a disclaimer must 
have several components: a declaration of at-will status, a disclaimer 
of the manual’s contractual significance, and a reservation of the 
employer’s right to modify its terms.203  Subsequent case law to which 
students are exposed further interprets Woolley to require that the 
disclaimer be prominently placed and comprehensible to the em-
ployee.204  That is a lot for the drafter to carry off, particularly in light 
of the client’s directive that the manual be employee-friendly and 
morale-enhancing.205 
 201 See Consolidated Student Comments Fall 2007–Spring 2008 (on file with au-
thor). 
 202 THE CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 47–51. 
 203 Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1271 (N.J. 1985). 
 204 See Evenson v. Colorado Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 879 P.2d 402, 409 (Colo. 
Ct. App. 1993); Nicosia v. Wakefern Food Corp., 643 A.2d 554, 560 (N.J. 1994); San-
chez v. Life Care Ctrs., 855 P.2d 1256, 1259 (Wyo. 1993). 
 205 It is for this reason that I have come to view the disclaimer proviso in the Wool-
ley opinion as somewhat tongue-and-cheek.  It seems highly unlikely that an employer 
would be willing to include the literal language the court proposes.  See Woolley 491 
A.2d at 1271 (“[R]egardless of what the manual says or provides, the employer prom-
ises nothing and remains free to change wages and all other working conditions 
without having to consult anyone and without anyone's agreement.”).  Certainly this 
is no “simple” addition to the handbook as the court suggests.  See id.  Furthermore, 
it is difficult to imagine that the New Jersey Supreme Court, well known for its pro-
gressive and pro-worker impulses, would set forth this important cause of action in 
an explicitly policy-based decision only to undercut everything it had penned in the 
final paragraph of the opinion.  The better understanding of the proviso is that the 
court was offering one final chastisement to the defendant for wanting things both 
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Identifying and complying with these individual elements, how-
ever, is only one aspect of the assignment.  Students must also fold in 
the holding of Conner, which denied summary judgment to the em-
ployer in a case involving a manual that appeared to have the requi-
site disclaimers in abundance.206  Conner forces a reevaluation of the 
hierarchy of legal rules.  Students tend to walk away from doctrinal 
instruction on handbooks with the impression that the disclaimer is 
the key proxy for determining contractual liability.  But a disclaimer 
is simply that—a clause that disclaims contractual commitment.  It is 
important to keep in mind what makes a handbook a binding con-
tract in the first place, which is the affirmative language regarding 
discipline and termination.  After all, there is no contract without a 
promise.  The take-away in terms of rule application is that an em-
ployer who wishes to avoid liability must not only disclaim contractual 
commitment but also eliminate from the handbook any promissory 
language that might conflict with the disclaimer. 
Ultimately, the students must successfully edit, as well as sup-
plement, handbook language, consistent with both the law and the 
client’s competing interest in maintaining a useful document.  Fur-
ther, they must accomplish these tasks as a group.  Students at times 
have reported frustration, beyond the usual dissatisfaction with group 
assignments, at the diversity of opinion generated within the group 
on the wording of the revision.207  This is part of the exercise design.  
The confluence of ideas within the group simulates the experience of 
working with other attorneys (and the client) on a shared case or pro-
ject.208  It also illustrates concretely the elusive nature of the legal 
standard, which determines contractual status based on the reason-
able expectations of the employee.209  The range of opinions within 
student groups likely accords with the range of perspectives reason-
able employees will have when reading the manual and to which the 
employer must be sensitive.  Finally, the variety of student opinions 
should offer the group a set of options as to where to strike the bal-
ance between managerial interests and risk avoidance.  Even if all 
ways—to realize the morale benefits its employee-friendly handbook would provide 
while remaining free to abide by it or not as it saw fit. 
 206 See Conner v. City of Forest Acres, 560 S.E.2d 606, 611 (S.C. 2002). 
 207 See Consolidated Comments, supra note 201. 
 208 See Brest, supra note 39, at 15 (“From the moment they enter practice, lawyers 
spend much of their time working collaboratively with others, including clients, oth-
er lawyers, legal assistants, and professionals in other fields. . . .  Yet law schools have 
not traditionally offered students many opportunities to work collaboratively, let 
alone to reflect systematically on their successes and failures in team efforts.”). 
 209 See Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1264. 
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students agree that certain language risks creating employee expecta-
tions, for instance about the security of their jobs, they may disagree 
as to whether they ought to eliminate that language given the em-
ployer’s other interests.210 
3. Lawyering as a Balancing Act 
At the end of the day (and to the great relief of the students), it 
is the client who decides what is in its best interest.  This aspect of the 
exercise provides a context for understanding an important value of 
the profession—that the lawyer is merely the enabler of the client’s 
wishes rather than the actual decision maker.211  The exercise clarifies 
the boundaries of the lawyer’s role while illustrating the way in which 
the lawyer facilitates client choice.212  Students should use the memo 
as an opportunity to provide the client with options where they are 
uncertain about the client’s priorities, as well as to acknowledge the 
risks and limitations of the option they recommend.  In this way, the 
process of generating content for the memo forces students to as-
sume the role of counselor and advisor.213  In addition, through draft-
ing the final product, students gain an exposure to a writing style that 
differs significantly from what they have experienced in the typical 
legal writing class focusing on research memos and briefs.214 
Ideally, the process of proposing and weighing alternatives also 
provides an experience analogous to contract negotiation.  In the 
handbook exercise, and in much of the transactional work subsumed 
within employment law, there is only one represented party engaged 
 210 See Brest, supra note 39, at 15 (“[D]rafting provides students with a sense of the 
inherent ambiguity and vagueness of language and, indeed, of what [has been] 
called the ‘indeterminacy of aim’ that characterizes our vision of the future.”) (citing 
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, 125–26 (1961)).  This Article further explores 
the topic of drafting in a state of uncertainty infra Part IV.C.3. 
 211 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (1983) (“A lawyer shall abide by a 
client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation . . . and shall consult 
with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued.”). 
 212 See id. R. 1.2(a) cmt. (“The client has ultimate authority to determine the pur-
poses to be served by legal representation, within the limits imposed by the law and 
the lawyer’s professional obligations.  Within those limits, a client also has a right to 
consult with the lawyer about the means . . . used in pursuing those objectives.”). 
 213 See Brest, supra note 39, at 15 (“The form of writing distinctive to counseling is 
the memorandum to a client analyzing his or her problem and setting out and evalu-
ating alternative courses of action. . . .  Drafting such documents calls for imagina-
tion in predicting different ways in which the future may unfold and for creativity 
and strategic choices about the precision or open-endedness of language.”). 
 214 Id. (asserting that the type of writing distinctive to client counseling “requir[es] 
students to analyze a set of facts (not already homogenized, as they typically are in 
appellate writing assignments) in terms of both legal and nonlegal considerations, 
and to present options and recommendations in nontechnical language”). 
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in planning—the employer.  Yet students are essentially serving two 
masters inasmuch as their charge is to balance the employer’s com-
peting legal and business interests.  As noted previously, the options 
they generate as a group will likely form a continuum between two 
contrasting positions—the handbook language that most instills posi-
tive workplace morale and the handbook language that most reduces 
the risk of legal liability. 
This in turn provides students with insight into the way com-
promise is generated in any business transaction on risk allocation is-
sues.  For instance, a buyer and seller negotiating a sale of goods may 
have competing views about how their agreement should account for 
the risk of a delay in the delivery of the merchandise.  The seller 
might desire a strong force majeure clause that includes a detailed 
but non-exhaustive list of circumstances that will excuse delay in per-
formance.  By contrast, the buyer will want a clause making time “of 
the essence” and recognizing no excuse for deviation.215  The result in 
most transactions involving players of equal bargaining power will be 
something between the two extremes, perhaps sanctioning “reason-
able” delays or parroting the basic legal standard for excuse by super-
vening events.216  An analogous compromise will likely result during 
the students’ process of creating the handbook.  Perhaps the best 
employee handbook is one that includes the requisite disclaimers, 
but does so using friendly, non-legal language that avoids any prom-
ise of job security, but expresses the “hope” that workers will have a 
long future with the company.  My own hope is that in the process of 
reaching this version, students will come to understand the range of 
options they can offer the client, as well as why the end result is often 
a somewhat dissatisfying middle ground. 
Ultimately, the exercise is about using professional judgment to 
plot a course of action in the face of uncertainty.  Professors con-
stantly remind students that there are no “right answers” in law 
school.  Generally, what they mean is that given the mutability of 
rules in a precedential system, and the reality that no two sets of facts 
are completely alike, one can never definitively predict how a court 
will apply the law in a particular case.  But the world of the transac-
tional lawyer is significantly more uncertain than this.  In addition to 
 215 Cf. Stark, supra note 37, at 226–27 (using continuum of possible “no litigation” 
clauses in context of sale of company to exemplify the skill of translating client risk 
allocation preferences into legal language). 
 216 See U.C.C. § 2-615(a) (2005) (allowing excuse of performance “if performance 
as agreed has been made impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency the non-
occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made”). 
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the slippery task of predicting legal results, he or she must account 
for the client’s fluctuating and indeterminate business needs.217  
Thus, in the handbook context, the ultimate legal question is how 
much promissory language will trigger a question of fact on the 
document’s contractual enforceability.  Determining how far to push 
the envelope on this open question requires a prediction as to where 
a court will draw the line between aspirational and binding language.  
But it also requires the lawyer to assess the degree of risk that is ap-
propriate for a client to take on this matter given its liability concerns 
and its interest in having a useful manual.  In other words, contend-
ing with uncertainty for the deal lawyer means facilitating a critical 
business choice.  The transactional lawyer must intersect legal predic-
tions with an understanding of the client’s own competing goals to 
help the client decide what is in its overall best interest.218 
4. Adding Value (A.K.A. Earning Your Keep) 
Of course, there are also limits on the degree to which the law-
yer can rely on the client to identify its own interests.  The lawyer 
brings professional expertise to the table and presumably has the 
ability to identify pitfalls that the client might otherwise overlook.  In 
the transactional literature this component of the lawyer’s role, the 
value added to the transaction, has garnered significant scholarly at-
tention and has obvious practical significance.219  A lawyer who does 
nothing more than facilitate a transaction is a mere intermediary 
whose services increase the total cost of the deal.220  Thus, identifying 
and augmenting value is of supreme importance to clients as well as a 
matter of self-preservation for the profession.  While scholars have 
 217 Myers, supra note 6, at 419 (“Students [think] that clients present matters to 
lawyers in relatively neat packages, that situations are static. . . .  In practice, however, 
situations are much more fluid.”); see also Brest, supra note 39, at 8 (“[A] good lawyer 
must be able to counsel clients and serve their interests beyond the confines of his 
technical expertise—to integrate legal considerations with the business, personal, 
political, and other nonlegal aspects of the matter.”) 
 218 Brest, supra note 39, at 8 (“[G]ood lawyers bring more to bear on a problem 
than legal knowledge and lawyering skills. They bring creativity, common sense, 
practical wisdom, and that most precious of attributes, good judgment.”). 
 219 See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset 
Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 244 (1984); Steven L. Schwarcz, Explaining the Value of 
Transactional Lawyering, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 486, 487–88 (2007); Mark C. Schu-
man, The Hired Gun as Facilitator: Lawyers and the Suppression of Business Disputes in Sili-
con Valley, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 679, 681 (1996). 
 220 See Gilson, supra note 219, at 241 (“Business lawyers are seen at best as a trans-
action cost . . . . ”). 
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theorized the transactional lawyer’s role in a variety of ways,221 most 
descriptions fit comfortably within the idea that the transactional law-
yer’s value-added is his or her ability to anticipate and reduce legal or 
business risks of which the client was unaware or was unable to elimi-
nate.222 
 The revision exercise gives students a taste of that role by leav-
ing a key issue unstated.  The client’s request is that the attorney re-
vise the manual; the client does not explicitly ask how the new man-
ual should be implemented in the workplace.  Yet the way in which 
the employer distributes the manual has important legal implications.  
As students know from DeMasse v. ITT Corp., at least some jurisdic-
tions will decline to recognize the validity of the employer’s unilateral 
modification absent “new” consideration and assent beyond contin-
ued employment.223  Thus, whether a court accepts the students’ revi-
sions as effectively eliminating any prior legal commitment will ulti-
mately hinge on this issue.  Selecting a method of disseminating the 
revised manual implicates business concerns as well.  If the client 
must supply new consideration, it will have to decide how much it can 
afford to spend in providing additional benefits to its workers.  The 
client must also account for logistical considerations, such as any ad-
ministrative difficulty that might inhere in providing new considera-
tion or securing employee signatures or other manifestations of as-
sent.  Finally, there is always the risk that efforts to secure knowing 
consent will emphasize the adverse change in the manual, thus send-
ing a negative message to workers and defeating the client’s goal of 
maintaining strong workplace morale. 
Students are explicitly told that DeMasse is one of only three cas-
es they can consider in completing the revision exercise, and almost 
all students include a reservation of the employer’s right to modify 
terms of the manual in their recommended disclaimer language.  Yet 
only a few students recognize that the addition of that language itself 
falls within the DeMasse paradigm—they are turning a manual that 
 221 See id. at 255 (positing that transactional lawyers add value by reducing transac-
tion costs by structuring deals to create appropriate incentives and reduce moral ha-
zard); Schwarcz, supra note 219, at 500 (arguing that transactional lawyers add value 
principally by reducing regulatory costs); Schuman, supra note 219, at 709 (contend-
ing that lawyers reduce transaction costs and thus add value by minimizing uncer-
tainty). 
 222 See Stark, supra note 37, at 228 (“‘Adding value to the deal’ is a euphemism for 
‘finding and resolving business issues.’”). 
 223 See DeMasse v. ITT Corp., 984 P.2d 1138, 1145 (Ariz. 1999) (“[C]ontinued em-
ployment alone is not sufficient consideration to support a modification to an implied-
in-fact contract.”); see also supra Part IV.A. 
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provides job security (a benefit to the employee) into one that re-
stores the at-will regime (a benefit to the employer).  When debrief-
ing the exercise, students invariably protest that they were never 
asked to advise on implementation, and to some extent I bear that in 
mind when assessing this aspect of the exercise.  But the fact that stu-
dents were not asked specifically to do this is precisely the point, and 
the widespread oversight of this issue offers the ultimate teachable 
moment as to what it means for transactional lawyers to practice law 
proactively. 
V. VALUING AND ENABLING INTEGRATIVE TEACHING 
The previous Part explained how one can implement the em-
ployment as transaction theory in the basic employment law course, 
as well as the pedagogical value in doing so.  Its goal was to provide 
faculty with the information necessary to carry out a transactional ex-
ercise should they be persuaded to adopt this form of teaching.  
Adapting a course to incorporate such techniques requires nothing 
other than a willingness to sacrifice some amount of substantive cov-
erage and devote the additional out-of-class time needed to grade a 
midterm assignment.  Importantly, it does not require any structural 
change in the law school curriculum.  A great deal can be accom-
plished toward better preparing students for legal practice through 
the concentrated efforts of professors in their own classrooms. 
That said, there are ways in which the curriculum can change to 
better support integrative teaching, as well as ways in which faculty 
can do more to assist one another.  This Article closes with prelimi-
nary thoughts about two developments that would strengthen efforts 
in this direction: the allocation of additional credits to upper-level 
substantive courses to enable the integration of practical training, 
and a commitment by faculty to teaching self-consciously and sharing 
their reflections with the academic community. 
A. The Case for a Four- (or Five-) Credit Hybrid 
The experience with the handbook revision exercise illustrates 
that doctrinal faculty can successfully incorporate a transactional 
skills component into a basic three-credit course.  Yet there are many 
limitations to that structure.  To fully realize the pedagogical value of 
the revision experience would require devoting significant class time 
beyond what I currently allot in my course.  In an ideal situation, 
prior to the out-of-class component of the exercise, the professor 
should engage students in a preliminary in-class discussion about how 
to approach the exercise, fielding ideas about what areas of the 
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handbook need to be revised and how.  He or she would then allow 
students in-class time to discuss the issues raised during the class dis-
cussion in their assigned groups, before sending them off to actually 
produce the revised draft and memo out of class.  The professor 
should also allot more time to debriefing the exercise after comple-
tion in order to allow for in-class review and critique of the students’ 
proposed revisions.  Finally, he or she should send students back to 
the drafting table to revise their revisions following the in-class re-
view. 
To minimize the loss in substantive coverage, I take various short 
cuts in administering the exercise.  In contrast to the description 
above, I limit preliminary class discussion to my expectations and re-
quirements of the exercise, the group activity occurs almost exclu-
sively outside of class, debriefing focuses broadly on the outcomes of 
the exercise and students’ experiences rather than providing a care-
ful critique of individual revision efforts, and there is no re-write.  
While I believe, and student feedback confirms, that the exercise is 
still extremely valuable, students are somewhat short-changed.224  For 
many, this is the one and only transactional skills experience of their 
law school careers and their sole exposure to drafting a document 
other than a memo or brief.225 
A more supportive structure for integrative teaching would allot 
an additional credit (or more) to each upper-level course for the 
purpose of incorporating a thorough skills experience.  In terms of 
the employment law course, students would have one additional class 
meeting per week devoted to application of substantive material in a 
practical context.226  This would include not only an extended version 
of the handbook revision exercise, but also other problem-solving ex-
ercises.  For instance, with more credit hours the professor might ask 
students to draft or revise an employee noncompete or arbitration 
agreement, prepare an opinion letter assessing whether a particular 
set of workers are exempt from mandatory overtime pay, or negotiate 
 224 See Consolidated Comments, supra note 201. 
 225 Indeed there is a chicken and egg problem at work here.  Presumably, faculty 
would be more willing to engage students in transactional exercises if doing so were 
not so time-consuming.  If more faculty members conducted exercises like this, stu-
dents would have the cognitive framework and practical experience to complete any 
one assignment more independently and efficiently. 
 226 This model tracks the structure of the Integrated Transactional Program, de-
scribed previously, in which students participate in a traditional class meeting (in ei-
ther trusts and estates or professional responsibility) and as well as participate in a 
weekly skills session.  See Myers, supra note 6, at 406–07. 
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the termination and severance provisions of an executive employ-
ment contract.227 
A comprehensive proposal for curricular reform is beyond the 
scope of this project.  However, there are many benefits to incorpo-
rating the multi-credit hybrid structure as a central component of any 
new curriculum.  The most important of these is the unique ability of 
a hybrid course to connect practical training to substantive law.  The 
hybrid approach directly addresses the Carnegie Report’s principal 
point—that law school untenably divides the cognitive and practical 
apprenticeships of professional education.228  In this way, it is more 
responsive to the insights of the report than many of the more wide-
scale proposals that have been publicized in its aftermath.229  The 
point of the Carnegie Report is not merely that students need more 
skills training, but that skills instruction must be mainstreamed into 
the core of law school pedagogy.230  Only by demonstrating how these 
bodies of learning bear on one another can we expect students to de-
velop professional competence.231 
In fact, it is possible to envision a reformed curriculum in which 
the multi-credit hybrid would be the default course structure among 
 227 For examples of such problems, see GLYNN, ARNOW-RICHMAN & SULLIVAN, supra 
note 123, at 3, 62, 166, 722.  Of course, such exercise need not only be transactional 
in nature.  For an illustration of how one might incorporate a litigation experience 
into a basic employment course, see Richard A. Bales, Conference Materials, Peda-
gogical Methods for Teaching Labor and Employment Law in the 21st Century, Se. 
Ass’n of Law Schools Ann. Meeting, Palm Beach, FL (August 1, 2008) (on file with 
author). 
 228 See THE CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 189; supra Part II.A. 
 229 See, e.g., Scott Jaschik, Overhauling Law School’s Third Year, INSIDE HIGHER ED 
(March 12, 2008), available at http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2008/03/12/ 
thirdyear (describing Washington & Lee’s new curriculum which “replac[es] all aca-
demic courses in the third year of its program with ‘experiential’ courses in which 
students will perform work equivalent to that done by lawyers”); Katherine Mangan, 
New Hampshire Allows Law Students to Demonstrate Court Skills in Lieu of Bar Exam, THE 
CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC., July 4, 2008, at 2 (describing program of the New 
Hampshire bar and Franklin Pierce Law School that allows students to bypass the bar 
examination by taking a “series of specialized courses and activities on top of the 
core classes required of all students” that focus on litigation and trial preparation 
skills); see also Robel, supra note 5 (discussing Indiana University School of Law’s new 
“economics and values of the profession” course that will be required in the first 
year).  This is not to say that such reforms are not valuable in their own right; cer-
tainly they do much to address law schools’ weaknesses in practical training gener-
ally.  But, as described, they do not appear to respond to the particular need for an 
integrative law school experience. 
 230 See THE CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 12 (describing the report’s peda-
gogical concern as “how to bring the teaching and learning of legal doctrine into 
more fruitful dialogue with the pedagogies of practice”); supra Part II.A. 
 231 See THE CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 12. 
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law schools’ upper-level offerings.  The typical law school course of 
study for the second and third year posits the purely doctrinal course 
as the standard platform for instruction with skills courses as op-
tional, add-on components.  Instead, the assumption might be that all 
upper-level courses have both doctrinal and pragmatic components.  
That is not to say that stand-alone skills experiences should be elimi-
nated.  Clinics, externships, practicum courses, and other intensive 
exposures form a critical, indeed irreplaceable, part of the curricu-
lum.  The point rather is that we cannot wholly outsource practical 
instruction to those programs.  Legal knowledge and legal skill are 
intimately related and equally important for professional success. 
Finally, the multi-credit hybrid approach is sensitive to the eco-
nomics of curricular choice.  An educational model that relies on this 
course structure does not entail expenditures for new programs nor 
does it necessarily require additional faculty.232  Existing faculty would 
teach more work-intensive courses, but assuming the appropriate 
credit allocation, they would teach fewer of them.233 
 232 It is possible that schools could make fruitful use of adjunct practitioners to 
assist in assessing written work or contributing to other aspects of the skills compo-
nent of such courses.  See, e.g., Fleischer, supra note 3, at 491 (describing how the Co-
lumbia deals course, in which students review real transaction documents, incorpo-
rates presentations by the local attorneys that brokered those transactions).  A 
thorough assessment of the most effective and economical means of staffing such 
courses is beyond the scope of this project.  It is important to note, however, that in-
tegrative teaching requires an integrated faculty.  The Carnegie Report recognizes that 
law schools’ common reliance on non-tenure track teachers to staff the curriculum’s 
skills offerings is a reflection of how the legal academy devalues this aspect of educa-
tion.  See THE CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 189.  To put the point more affirma-
tively, student learning is enriched where faculty demonstrate expertise in both the-
ory and practice.  For these reasons, as well as others documented by legal scholars, 
this Article does not support the proliferation of full-time, semi-permanent non-
tenure track teaching positions to address deficits in faculty resources.  See, e.g., Ma-
rina Angel, The Glass Ceiling for Women in Legal Education: Contract Positions and the 
Death of Tenure, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (2000). 
 233 To be clear, this Article does not mean to suggest that the resource allocation 
issues can be uniformly addressed by allocating a set amount number of credits to 
each (formerly) “doctrinal” class.  Law schools will need to assess and determine 
what constitutes a skills experience, what amount of skills instruction justifies credit 
augmentation, whether student performance in experiential components of basic 
courses should be separately assessed, and a host of other related academic matters.  
Separate discussions may also be required to determine how such teaching is valued 
in fulfillment of faculty members’ required teaching load.  For instance, the number 
of students enrolled in these courses will likely be a consideration in assigning teach-
ing loads, given the close student contact and additional assessment required of fac-
ulty teaching skills in their substantive courses.  All of these matters require signifi-
cant study, and perhaps trial and error, and are therefore beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
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B. On Becoming a Teacher-Scholar 
Another implication of this Article is that the worlds of doctrine, 
theory, and practice are not so far apart.  From a functional perspec-
tive, the transactional exercise provides an example of the integration 
of substantive teaching and practical training.  But it also relies on an 
underlying jurisprudential theory and emerging scholarly trend.  The 
private turn in employment law jurisprudence coupled with the in-
sights of new intitutionalist scholars justify the focus on transactional 
law practice as a central site for experiential learning.234  Just as prac-
tice and substance are intricately related to one another, so is schol-
arship and pedagogy. 
In the same vein, it behooves us as faculty to consider teaching—
both the substance and methodology of what goes on in the class-
room—with the intellectual rigor generally reserved for scholar-
ship.235  What has been called the “Scholarship of Teaching and 
Learning” has a long tradition among academics and has been rec-
ognized in recent decades as a critical component of the work that 
faculty do.236  Such scholarship seeks to create a “teaching commons” 
by bringing to the public discourse the “intellectual work that is regu-
larly being done” in the classroom.237  As yet however, the tradition 
has made only modest inroads into the legal academy.238 
This Article is not the place to speculate as to why law professors 
are latecomers to the movement nor to wade into the debate over 
 234 See supra Part III.B. 
 235 See MARY TAYLOR HUBER & PAT HUTCHINGS, THE CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING: BUILDING THE TEACHING 
COMMONS 18 (2005) (suggesting that “all faculty” should “bring their habits, meth-
ods, and commitments as scholars to their work as teachers—and to their students’ 
learning.”). 
 236 See ERNEST L. BOYER, supra note 8, at [PIN CITE]; see also HUBER & HUTCHINGS, 
supra note 235, at 17 (describing past research and teaching traditions that have con-
tributed to the emergence of the field). 
 237 See HUBER & HUTCHINGS, supra note 235, at 18 (quoting Dan Bernstein, Repre-
senting the Intellectual Work in Teaching Through Peer-Reviewed Course Portfolios, in THE 
TEACHING OF PSYCHOLOGY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF WILBERT J. MCKEACHIE AND CHARLES L. 
BREWER [PIN CITE] (Davis & Buskist eds., 2001)). 
 238 For some examples of law school-related work in this tradition, see Andrea A. 
Curcio et al., Does Practice Make Perfect? An Empirical Examination of the Impact of Practice 
Essays on Essay Exam Performance, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 271 (2008); Larry O. Natt 
Gantt, II, Deconstructing Thinking Like a Lawyer: Analyzing the Cognitive Components of the 
Analytical Mind, 29 CAMPBELL L. REV. 413 (2007); and Alice M. Thomas, Laying the 
Foundation for Better Student Learning in the Twenty-First Century: Incorporating an Inte-
grated Theory of Legal Education into Doctrinal Pedagogy, 6 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 49 (2000). 
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what constitutes academic scholarship.239  The point rather is that se-
rious, reflective assessment of our work in the classroom enriches our 
experience as both educators and scholars and, further, that public 
exposition of such endeavors is an obligation we owe our colleagues 
and institutions.  I will teach my class better having written this Arti-
cle, and I hope others will teach better having read it. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article has presented a new pedagogical perspective on 
teaching employment law, one based on the theme of employment as 
transaction.  While employment litigation is an ever growing part of 
the judicial docket, a significant portion of the practice of employ-
ment law focuses on the ex ante creation of employment relation-
ships and compliance with legal mandates.  Developments in em-
ployment law jurisprudence reveal increased judicial deference to 
private ordering in assessing rights and liabilities in the workplace, 
and a growing area of employment law scholarship has exposed the 
critical role that institutional actors play—employers, their lawyers, 
and other agents—in the realization of workplace rights.  It is time to 
give these concepts a more prominent place in the classroom. 
Doing so necessarily requires more than teaching legal doctrine. 
As the Carnegie Report confirms, the standard pedagogy of discerning 
rules from cases and applying them to hypothetical fact patterns, 
while valuable and necessary to cultivating legal analysis skills, cannot 
alone prepare students for professional practice.  This Article has 
demonstrated that the integration of a realistic exercise into a basic 
employment law class is a feasible undertaking that exposes students 
to the much neglected area of transactional practice and makes a 
significant stride toward bridging the persistent gap between legal 
analysis and lawyering.  Finally, this Article has proffered the multi-
credit hybrid course as the building block for an integrative upper-
level curriculum.  By mainstreaming skills and teaching them in tan-
dem with substantive material, we demonstrate how these segregated 
components of the curriculum share space in the real world of legal 
practice and hopefully offer students a better foundation for achiev-
ing professional competence when they leave our classrooms. 
 239 See HUBER & HUTCHINGS, supra note 235, at 30 (recognizing that the place of 
teaching and learning scholarship in the academic reward system may well depend 
on the extent to which such research “closely parallels the features of traditional 
scholarship and leads to traditional forms of publication”). 
